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Introduction
This article presents findings from an empirical study of trial judges‘ rulings on
allegations of police perjury over a twenty-four month period in the United States District for the
District of Kansas. The article then relies on these findings to argue that the United States
Supreme Court‘s current conception of the judge-made exclusionary rule undermines the ideals
the majority purports to advance and ignores other values of a dependable justice system.
In 1926, Judge Benjamin Cardozo famously quipped about the exclusionary rule1—a
criminal should not ―go free because the constable . . . blundered.‖2 Recently, writing for a fivejustice majority3 in Herring v. United States, Chief Justice Roberts quoted Cardozo‘s catchy
phrase in holding that the exclusionary rule does not bar evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, as long as the police are merely negligent in obtaining the evidence and
their negligence is ―nonrecurring and attenuated.‖4

The current Court majority deems the

exclusionary rule a judge-made tool designed solely to deter police from infringing on a criminal
defendant‘s constitutional rights.5 Thus, at least five justices6 apply the rule only when the
likelihood of deterrence is appreciable and the benefits of that deterrence outweigh the costs of
excluding evidence.7 The majority in Herring reasoned: ―The principal cost of applying the rule
is, of course, letting guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free,‖8 something that ―offends

1

The exclusionary rule generally bars the prosecution from using evidence against a defendant in a criminal case
when the evidence was gathered in violation of the defendant‘s constitutional rights. Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
2
People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.). The case was decided when Cardozo was a judge;
later, he became Justice Cardozo.
3
Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito formed this majority.
4
Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702 (2009).
5
Id. at 699 (stating that the Fourth Amendment protects the people‘s right to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures but ―contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its
commands‖ (quoting Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10 (1995))).
6
The views of Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kagan on whether the exclusionary rule is a constitutional requirement
or a judge-made doctrine are untested.
7
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 700.
8
Id. at 701.
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basic concepts of the criminal justice system,‖ including placing a ―costly toll upon truth-seeking
and law enforcement objectives.‖9
The Court‘s interpretation of the function of the exclusionary rule was not always so
limited. Historically, the exclusionary rule served not only to deter unlawful police conduct but
also to protect the integrity of the judicial system. In fact, in Mapp v. Ohio, in which the Court
held that the rule applies to state law enforcement officers, as well as federal agents, the Court
expressly criticized Judge Cardozo‘s opinion regarding the exclusionary rule, noting ―another
consideration—the imperative of judicial integrity‖—that merits application of a rule that
sometimes results in the release of a ―criminal.‖10 The Court in Mapp reasoned: ―The criminal
goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more
quickly than its failure to observe its own laws . . . .‖11
If the current Court majority is correct that the Fourth Amendment does not require the
exclusion of evidence as its remedy and that the exclusionary rule serves only to deter police
misconduct in cases in which the benefits and likelihood of deterrence outweigh the harm of
releasing a guilty person, then the Court‘s refusal to exclude evidence in cases of simple police
mistake or negligence follows. Negligence is difficult to deter, and an innocent police mistake
often does not mean that the apprehended suspect is either innocent or harmless. If the Court‘s
premises are correct, then the Court is right to shrink application of the exclusionary rule in some
instances such as in Arizona v. Evans,12 in which police searched a car and uncovered
contraband, acting in good-faith reliance on the assurances of a court employee that there was an

9

Id. (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998)).
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 653, 659 (1961); see also id. at 649, 657, 659 (stating that the exclusionary rule is
―of constitutional origin‖ and ―is an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments‖); Whiteley v.
Warden, Wyo. State Pen., 401 U.S. 560 (1971).
11
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659.
12
514 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1995).
10
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outstanding warrant for the driver, and in Herring, in which police relied on an isolated incident
involving outdated information in the police computer system that incorrectly listed a suspect as
having an outstanding warrant.13
Even embracing the majority‘s reasoning from Herring for cases involving isolated
police negligence, other cases—those in which police lie to circumvent the exclusionary rule—
reveal that the majority‘s current balancing formula places undue emphasis on the costs
associated with release of a guilty defendant and, as a result, undermines the ―truth-seeking and
law enforcement objectives‖ the majority claims to protect. Imagine a case in which police
violate a suspect‘s constitutional rights and then lie to cover up their misconduct. Perhaps on an
unsupported hunch, a Kansas Highway Patrol officer observes a car with Texas license plates
driving on a major highway. The officer observes that the driver appears Hispanic and that there
is a rental sticker attached to the car‘s rear window. Without probable cause or reasonable
suspicion to believe that the driver has violated any law, the officer stops the car and asks the
driver for permission to search. The driver, now nervous, agrees. The search, which turns into
multiple searches with the help of a drug dog and other officers, eventually reveals an extensive
stash of cocaine.

The officer has successfully identified a guilty person but has used

unconstitutional methods to do so. Understanding that there was no probable cause for the stop
and that application of the exclusionary rule will doom the case, the trooper goes to court in
response to the defendant‘s motion to suppress evidence and testifies that the driver twice veered
from his lane of traffic onto the road‘s shoulder in violation of Kansas traffic laws.
If the judge accepts the officer‘s testimony, then there was probable cause to stop the car
and valid consent to search it. As a result, the defendant‘s motion to suppress will be denied. If
the motion is denied, the defendant is likely to plead guilty, ending the case. If, however, the
13

Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 699.
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judge rejects the officer‘s testimony as lacking credibility, the evidence must be suppressed.
Without the traffic infraction, there was no legal basis for the stop. In most cases, suppression of
the evidence means that the guilty defendant goes free.
Although the Kansas officer acted in knowing violation of the Fourth Amendment while
the officer in Herring acted at worst negligently, the costs of imposing the exclusionary rule are
the same in both cases under the majority‘s reasoning from Herring. A guilty person will be
released. The difference from Herring is that at least in theory, the Kansas officer could be
deterred from stopping cars without probable cause. The officer knew that he was acting in
violation of the Constitution; therefore, suppression of the evidence might convince the officer
(and others like him) going forward to stop only those drivers who violate traffic laws. The flaw
in this analysis rests with the Court‘s failure to consider a second option. The officer might,
instead, learn to tell a more convincing lie. If the officer falls into the latter category, then the
majority‘s deterrence-alone justification for the exclusionary rule leads to an absurd result.
Under the majority‘s reasoning, the trial judge should deny the motion to suppress, even though
the officer knowingly obtained the evidence through unconstitutional means. The likelihood of
deterrence is not appreciable; yet, the cost of excluding the evidence—letting the drug distributor
free—remains.

Furthermore, because the officer‘s lie did not distort the truth about the

defendant‘s guilt for trafficking in drugs, one might argue that the need for deterrence is
marginal anyway.

Albeit demonstrating extensive and culpable police misconduct, from a

deterrence versus cost-of-release perspective, the case looks just like Herring.
Notably, the Kansas case discussed above is a real case from my study of the District of
Kansas. Further, prior empirical studies suggest that this police stop scenario is far from unique.
Since 1961, when the Supreme Court declared in Mapp that the exclusionary rule applies to both
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state and federal criminal prosecutions,14 several studies have concluded that police regularly
commit perjury to avoid the exclusion of evidence.15 Because some police do lie to circumvent
the exclusionary rule,16 the hypothetical posed here demonstrates a critical defect in the
majority‘s conception. At best, the rule deters some fraction of unwanted police conduct. But,
to use Justice Roberts‘s words, it also fails to account for the ―costly toll upon truth-seeking and
law enforcement objectives,‖ beyond the release of a guilty person. Specifically, the majority
fails to consider the price of police perjury in the balance of interests for and against exclusion.
As scholars have argued, police perjury can result in wrongful convictions and imposes many
other costs17 that sometimes warrant a remedy as extreme as release of a guilty defendant.18
In a perfect world in which the police always tell the truth, or in which trial judges
effectively identify and manage police perjury, the majority‘s view of the exclusionary rule
might work effectively. In such a world, there would be only two competing values—the

14

See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 643.
See, e.g., COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION
PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT: COMMISSION REPORT 36 (1994) [hereinafter The Mollen Report]
(finding that the most common form of police corruption in the New York City criminal justice system was probably
―police falsification,‖ especially in connection with arrests for possession of ―narcotics and guns,‖ and that
falsification was so common that it had spawned the name ―testilying.‖); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence,
Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 7576, 82 (1992) [hereinafter Orfield, The 1992 Study] (discussing the results of a study on police perjury in the
Chicago justice system and concluding that police fabricate police reports and affidavits for search warrants to
create artificial probable cause); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study
of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016 (1987) [hereinafter Orfield, The 1987 Study] (reporting that
officers admitted that police sometime lie to avoid the suppression of evidence); Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the
Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 739-40 (1970) (finding that some officers admit to
twisting facts to avoid the suppression of evidence); Comment, Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search-andSeizure Practices in Narcotics Cases, 4 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 87, 95 (1968) [hereinafter Effect of Mapp]
(discussing the results of a police perjury study conducted by Columbia Law students and concluding that police
probably fabricated testimony to create probable cause); JEROME SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 215 (1967)
(reporting police perjury based on observation evidence).
16
Interestingly, the most likely reason for police to lie about their conduct in suppression hearings is the same
reason that the U.S. Supreme Court majority gives for applying the exclusionary rule sparingly. Police do not want
guilty defendants to escape prosecution simply because officers have violated the Constitution in obtaining the
evidence. See Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037,
1043 (1996) (―[T]he most common venue for testilying is the suppression hearing . . . .‖).
17
See, e.g., Melanie D. Wilson, An Exclusionary Rule for Police Lies, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2010); I. Bennett
Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835 (2008); Slobogin, supra note 16.
18
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659 (Clark, J.).
15
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likelihood of deterring unconstitutional police conduct balanced against the cost of a failed
prosecution. But my Kansas study reveals that trial judges may be failing to fulfill this important
role of identifying police perjury, either because they are unable to distinguish carefully crafted
lies from truth or because they err on the side of punishing a culpable defendant, even if police
may have lied. In either event, because some police lie to avoid the effects of the exclusionary
rule, the Supreme Court‘s current conception of the rule undercounts the costs associated with
police lies that create the appearance that deterrence is irrelevant because the police claim to
have complied with the Constitution.
The study at the heart of this article evaluates judicial orders issued over a two-year
period in 2008 and 2009 in the District of Kansas.19 The data derived from the study reveals that
criminal defendants rarely assert in pleadings or hearings that the police lied about the
investigation of their cases. When defendants do make such claims, they typically make them in
the context of moving to suppress evidence, arguing that the police violated the defendant‘s
constitutional rights and lied to cover up the violation. In the suppression context and otherwise,
when they allege police dishonesty, defendants frequently support their allegations with
corroborative evidence. Sometimes, the evidence of police perjury is limited to the defendant‘s
own testimony, but defendants often produce eyewitnesses or other proof, such as documents or
video recordings. Occasionally, under cross-examination, the police testify in conflicting ways,
casting doubt on their own testimony. Regardless of the type of evidence defendants offer in
support of their claims, federal trial judges in the District of Kansas almost always rule in favor
of the government and refuse to apply the exclusionary rule.

19

I chose the District of Kansas over other districts because the court‘s website provides extensive, publicallyavailable information about the court‘s rulings. Comparable information is difficult to find in other trial courts, at a
federal or state level.
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In the two-year period studied, defendants asserted police dishonesty in a small
percentage of cases. Judges were asked to decide allegations of police dishonesty in only thirtyone of 584 orders. In seven cases in which they asserted police dishonesty, defendants produced
little to no evidence to support their claims, virtually forcing trial judges to rule for the
government. In fifteen of the thirty-one cases in which a defendant claimed that the police lied
about an investigation, the evidence of dishonesty was competing and could have been decided
for the police or the defense, depending on who was burdened with proving credibility. In one of
those fifteen cases, involving a sentencing issue, the trial judge ruled for the defendant without
reaching the credibility issue. In the remaining fourteen cases with competing evidence, the trial
judges decided that police were believable.
In nine of thirty-one cases, the defendant produced substantial evidence of at least one
significant police error, if not a lie. In one of the nine cases with the strongest evidence of police
dishonesty, the judge avoided the police credibility issue and decided for the government as a
matter of law. In two cases, trial judges found that police were not credible. In the remaining
six, judges credited police testimony. In other words, in close cases and in cases in which the
evidence supported a finding of police dishonesty, trial judges usually decided in favor of the
government. The findings of this Kansas study, therefore, are consistent with various scholars‘
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contentions that trial judges ―habitually accept[] the policeman‘s word‖20 and may even ignore
police lies ―to prevent the suppression of evidence and assure conviction.‖21
Because lies are difficult to prove and hard to distinguish from innocent mistakes or
negligent errors, it is possible that Kansas trial judges identified police perjury in the only two
cases in which it occurred during the time studied. But when viewed in light of other studies of
police dishonesty, especially in the context of suppression hearings, it seems at least equally
likely that some police lies slipped by consciously or sub-consciously undetected.22 Perhaps
unwittingly, the Supreme Court majority‘s conception of the exclusionary rule encourages
callousness toward police dishonesty and denial of suppression motions. As currently applied by
the majority, the exclusionary rule focuses on ensuring prosecution of seemingly guilty
defendants to the exclusion of other equally important interests, such as police integrity, judicial
impartiality, and respect for the rule of law. Relying on the findings from my study of the
District of Kansas for support, this article argues for a more historically grounded, if not ―more
majestic,‖ conception of the exclusionary rule.
Dissenting in Herring, Justice Ginsburg, writing for herself and Justice Stevens,23
Souter, and Breyer, argued in support of such a majestic conception, contending that while a
primary objective of the exclusionary rule is deterrence, the rule ―also serves other important
20

ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE xxi-xxii (1983) (identifying thirteen ―key rules‖ of our justice system,
including: ―Rule IV: Almost all police lie about whether they violated the Constitution in order to convict guilty
defendants. Rule V: All prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys are aware of Rule IV . . . . Rule VIII: Most trial
judges pretend to believe police officers who they know are lying‖); Laurie L. Levenson, Unnerving the Judges:
Judicial Responsibility for the Rampart Scandal, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 787, 790-91 (2001) (asserting that judges
sometimes ―ignor[e] telltale signs that police officers fabricate testimony to obtain convictions‖); David N.
Dorfman, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 455, 470-21 (1999) (indicating that ―a
scathing opinion impugning the motives, honesty, or competency of police is rarely found in trial court opinions‖).
21
Orfield, The 1992 Study, supra note 15, at 76. See also Levenson, supra note 20, at 790 (describing how judicial
conduct can contribute to police dishonesty and stating that ―judges unwittingly participate in police perjury and
misconduct by not critically examining police credibility‖); Irving Younger, Constitutional Protection on Search
and Seizure Dead?, TRIAL, Aug.-Sept. 1967, at 41 (claiming that judges rarely recognize police perjury).
22
See supra notes 15 and 20.
23
Justice Stevens has, of course, recently retired. Justice Kagan now serves in place of Justice Stevens. We do not
know yet Justice Kagan‘s views on this issue.
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purposes,‖ such as allowing judges ―to avoid the taint of partnership in official lawlessness‖24
and preventing the government from profiting from its own lawless behavior that would
―undermine popular trust in government.‖25 Justice Ginsburg‘s dissent echoes Justice Stevens‘s
earlier dissent in Evans, in which he contended that the constitutional text and history of the
Fourth Amendment‘s adoption and interpretation ―identify a more majestic conception‖ of the
exclusionary rule than limiting its purpose to deterring police misconduct.26 As Justice Ginsburg
noted in Herring, and Justice Stevens said in Evans, the proper application of the exclusionary
rule merely places the government in the position it would have been in had there been no
unconstitutional search or seizure.27

Preventing the government from benefitting from its

unlawful behavior protects the integrity of judges and the judicial system, avoiding the
possibility that judges become ―accomplices in the willful disobedience of a Constitution they
are sworn to uphold.‖28
This article demonstrates that this ―more majestic‖ conception is an essential component
of any effective exclusionary rule designed to deter avoidable police misconduct, particularly
because the Ginsburg-Stevens view better accounts for the costs associated with failing to apply
the exclusionary rule in cases in which the police may have lied to circumvent the exclusion of
evidence. While the goals of truth-seeking and enforcement of the law may be served by the
admission of evidence obtained because of good faith police mistakes, the same is not true of

24

The majority rejected this ―more majestic‖ conception of the exclusionary rule in favor of deterrence alone.
Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700 n.2 (2009).
25
Id. at 707 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
26
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 18 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
222 (1960) (noting the importance of judicial integrity in application of the exclusionary rule).
27
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 705 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Evans, 514 U.S. at 19 (Steven, J., dissenting) (asserting that
application of the exclusionary rule is not harsh because it ―merely places the government in the same position as if
it had not conducted the illegal search and seizure in the first place‖).
28
Elkins, 364 U.S. at 223 (recognizing that the existence of the government will be imperiled if the government
fails to observe the law scrupulously).
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evidence tainted by lies told by the very law enforcement officers who owe a duty to uphold the
law.29
This article unfolds in three parts. Part I reviews the results of studies predating this one.
Those earlier studies reveal that police sometimes commit perjury in suppression hearings to
prevent judges from excluding evidence of a defendant‘s guilt. Two of the studies conclude that
judges knowingly acquiesce in police perjury so that they too avoid letting a guilty defendant
escape prosecution. Part II of the article discusses the current study, including my pre-study
hypotheses, the study‘s methodology, and limits of the study. Part III presents detailed findings
of the study and relies on those findings in arguing that the majority‘s conception of the
exclusionary rule is ill-conceived because it ignores the likelihood that police perjury is
interfering with the deterrence of unwanted police misconduct. Part III then urges the Supreme
Court to return to historic precedent regarding the exclusionary rule and to embrace the
Ginsburg-Stevens ―more majestic‖ version of the exclusionary rule, at least in cases of potential
police dishonesty.
I. Prior Studies30
Several researchers and groups have studied police perjury. The studies vary in methods
and locations. Despite their diversity, each study has concluded that police perjury occurs
frequently in the suppression context. Notwithstanding apparent consensus that police perjury
occurs everywhere and too often, there has been little research on how judges decide issues of

29

Three experiments conducted by Professor Kenworthey Bilz also suggest that ―reinvigorating the integrity
justification‖ for the exclusionary rule ―would serve the ends of the Rule better than current doctrine [focusing on
deterrence alone] does.‖ Kenworthey Bilz, Dirty Hands or Deterrence? An Experimental Examination of the
Exclusionary Rule 2 (Northwestern Public Research Paper No. 10-28), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1629375.
30
Studies that pre-date the decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which applied the exclusionary rule to
the states, are omitted from this discussion because scholars commonly assert that it was the decision in Mapp that
increased the incentives for police to lie and, correspondingly, the pressure on judges to accept those lies to avoid
excluding evidence of defendants‘ guilt.

10
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1534132

police credibility and how much and what type of evidence seems to influence judges to rule for
the defendant on such allegations. This Part recaps the findings of the prior studies.
A. Studies Finding Police Perjury Commonplace
The late Irving Younger, who served as prosecutor, judge, and law professor during his
distinguished career, asserted that in the first few months after the Supreme Court decided
Mapp,31 ―New York policemen continued to tell the truth [about how they had obtained evidence
of unlawful drug possession], with the result that in a large number of cases the evidence was
suppressed.‖32 Younger declared that soon ―police made the great discovery that if the defendant
drops the narcotics on the ground, after which the policeman arrests him, the search is reasonable
and the evidence is admissible.‖33 Based on sudden and systematic changes in police testimony,
Younger theorized that police had begun to lie during hearings and to create stories that would
meet constitutional requirements and avoid suppression of drug evidence.34
A study conducted by students at Columbia Law School, published in 1968,35 supported
Younger‘s theory. The students evaluated the evidentiary grounds for arrest and disposition of
misdemeanor narcotics cases in New York City before and after Mapp.36 The study showed that
a significant number of officers had probably fabricated their testimony to ―fit within [the
probable cause requirements] of Mapp‖ and avoid the suppression of illegally-seized evidence.37
In part, the students‘ findings were based on data revealing that after Mapp, there was a ―sharp
decline‖ in allegations that ―contraband was found on the defendant‘s body or hidden in the
premises‖ and a corresponding, ―suspicious rise in cases in which uniform and plainclothes

31

Mapp, 367 U.S. 643 (applying the exclusionary rule to state prosecutions).
Younger, supra note 21, at 41.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Effect of Mapp, supra note 15, at 87.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 103.
32
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officers alleged that the defendant dropped the contraband to the ground‖ or had it ―in hand‖ or
―openly exposed in the premises.‖38 The students‘ research showed ―a marked increase in
allegations by uniform and plainclothes men which would fit within the requirements of
Mapp.‖39 As the authors of a 1998 empirical study of the exclusionary rule said of the Columbia
law students‘ report: ―It strains credulity to believe that after Mapp there just happened to be a
near three-fold increase in arrests based on drugs found in the open. The more likely conclusion
is that the advent of the exclusionary rule led to a dramatic increase in police fabrication.‖40
The findings of the ―Mollen Commission,‖ which studied police corruption in New York
City some twenty years later, were consistent with Younger‘s assertions and the Columbia law
students‘ findings.41

Formally named the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police

Corruption and the Anti-Corruption Procedures of the Police Department, the Mollen
Commission was appointed in 1992 and produced a written report in 1994 following an
extensive investigation.42 As part of the investigation, the Commission analyzed thousands of
police department documents, including Internal Affairs records,43 and conducted over one
hundred private hearings and informal interviews.44

The interviews included ―scores‖ of

meetings with members of law enforcement who regularly dealt with the New York police,
including employees of the district attorneys‘ offices, employees of the U.S. Attorney‘s office,

38

Id. at 95.
Id. See also Sarah Barlow, Patterns of Arrests for Misdemeanor Narcotics Possession: Manhattan Police
Practices 1960-62, 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 549, 549-50 (1968) (studying 3,971 arrests in Manhattan, New York, and
suggesting that police had turned to ―dropsy‖ testimony to avoid application of the exclusionary rule).
40
L. Timothy Perrin, H. Mitchell Caldwell, Carol A. Chase & Ronald W. Fagan, If It’s Broken, Fix It: Moving
Beyond the Exclusionary Rule: A New and Extensive Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and a Call for a Civil
Administrative Remedy to Partially Replace the Rule, 83 IOWA L. REV. 669, 693 (1998).
41
See The Mollen Report, supra note 15.
42
Id. at 1.
43
Id. at 11.
44
Id. at 11-12.
39
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agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and employees of other federal agencies. 45 The
Mollen Commission not only found widespread corruption within the New York City Police
Department but also reported that falsification by officers, including ―testilying,‖ was ―probably
the most common form of police corruption.‖46
Using various research methods and evaluating data from jurisdictions beyond New
York, other legal scholars came to the same reasoned conclusion as did Younger, the Columbia
law students, and the Mollen Commission—that police officers lie with some regularity to avoid
application of the exclusionary rule during suppression hearings.

Based on extensive and

personal observation research in a city of about 400,000 people, Professor Jerome H. Skolnick47
concluded that police sometimes fabricate probable cause when they think that search and
seizure laws are too restrictive.48 Skolnick spent extensive periods with police, ―viewing and
observing, talking about the life of the policeman, and the work of the policeman.‖ 49 Skolnick‘s
conclusions were anecdotal, derived from what he saw and heard from officers, but his study
―had the advantage of first-hand experience.‖50

Joseph Grano51 undertook a similar

observational study. After spending a year working in a prosecutor‘s office in Philadelphia,
―handling almost exclusively motions to suppress evidence,‖ Grano learned that police are ―not

45

Id.
Id. at 36.
47
Skolnick is a co-director of the Center for Research in Crime and Justice at New York University School of Law.
48
SKOLNICK, supra note 15, at 215 (explaining that when a police officer sees case law ―as a hindrance to his
primary task of apprehending criminals, he usually attempt[s] to construct the appearance of compliance, rather than
allow the offender to escape apprehension‖). Skolnick described the city he studied as ―a ‗real city,‘ . . . reputed to
have an exemplary machinery for administering criminal justice.‖ Id. at 25. See also Oaks, supra note 15, at 725
(―If the officer has any reason to conceal improper behavior, the courtroom issue typically becomes a contest of
credibility that the trier of fact is likely to resolve in favor of the officer.‖).
49
SKOLNICK, supra note 15, at 33. Skolnick also spent time with prosecutors and defense lawyers. Id. at 40.
50
See Perrin et al., supra note 40, at 710 (detailing previous empirical studies of the exclusionary rule and critiquing
the pros and cons of the Skolnick study).
51
Grano died in 2002. When he died, he was a Distinguished Professor of Law at Wayne State University.
46
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adverse to committing perjury to save a case.‖52 Grano explained that this conclusion rested on
his ―conversations with police officers in preparation for suppression hearings in which the
willingness to change facts was subtly—and sometimes openly—expressed‖ and on the fact that
in ―many cases‖ the officers‘ testimony ―seemed incredible‖ but the court credited the testimony
anyway.53
Dallin Oaks54 explored the effect of the exclusionary rule in criminal proceedings in
Chicago and the District of Columbia55 and reported that during his research ―[h]igh-ranking
police officers . . . admitted . . . that some experienced officers will ‗twist‘ the facts in order to
prevent suppression of evidence and release of persons whom they know to be guilty.‖56
According to Oaks, one officer maintained:
Fabrication occurs in two types of situations. First, where a patrolman has made
an on-view arrest and officers of a special detail can reach the scene before he has
submitted his written report, they assist him in submitting a report that will not
prevent a conviction under some rule of an appellate court. . . . The officer
estimated that this type of twisting of facts occurred in about one-third of the
cases where special detail officers assisted patrolmen with their reports. The
second type is a direct fabrication of probable cause for an arrest and search. The
police stop and search a motor vehicle and its occupants. If they discover the
proceeds or implements of a crime, such as stolen goods, burglary tools or a
weapon, they ―hang a traffic offense on him afterward to ice it up, and they say
the [evidence] was in plain view on the floor when it was really under the seat.‖57
In 1992, noting the ―limited empirically-grounded information on the [exclusionary]
rule‘s application and effects,‖ Professor Myron Orfield58 published the results of a study based
on ―structured interviews with judges, prosecutors, and public defenders in the Chicago criminal

52

Joseph D. Grano, A Dilemma for Defense Counsel: Spinelli-Harris Search Warrants and the Possibility of Police
Perjury, 1971 U. ILL. L. F. 405, 409 (1971).
53
Id.
54
Oaks was a law professor at the University of Chicago and later President of Brigham Young University.
55
For instance, Oaks obtained data on motions to suppress filed in each jurisdiction. Oaks, supra note 15, at 681.
56
Id. at 739-40.
57
Id. at 742. The officer estimated that this second type of fabrication occurs very often (98% of the time when the
target is a ―professional‖ thief but ―rarely‖ if the subject is not notorious). Id.
58
Orfield is a Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota.
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court system‖ in which ―respondents outlined a pattern of pervasive police perjury intended to
avoid the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.‖59 His research revealed that a sampling of
these lawyers and judges estimated that ―police commit perjury between 20% and 50% of the
time they testify on Fourth Amendment issues.‖60

Participants also reported ―systematic

fabrications in case reports and affidavits for search warrants, creating artificial probable cause
which forms the basis of later testimony.‖61 Orfield had conducted a similar study, published in
1987, during which he interviewed twenty-six narcotics officers of the Chicago Police
Department.62 The interviews of police officers, undertaken with a lengthy questionnaire, asked
(among other things) how frequently officers lie in court.63 According to Orfield, ―Virtually all
of the officers admit that the police commit perjury, if infrequently, at suppression hearings.‖64
As Orfield noted in the officers article, the tendency of questions like the ones he posed would be
to elicit self-serving responses. Therefore, ―it is possible that the frequency of police lying in
court is greater than the police admit.‖65
Orfield‘s intuition about the under-reporting of police lies is buttressed by the resistance
researchers experienced from police officers more recently when they proposed similar interview
questions. Law professors at Pepperdine University planned to ask police about the extent to
which they lie to avoid the suppression of evidence. In pre-study testing, though, officer after
officer ―expressed concern about the questions, noting that they essentially required the

59

Orfield, The 1992 Study, supra note 15, at 75, 82-83.
Id. at 83.
61
Id.
62
Orfield, The 1987 Study, supra note 15, at 1024. Orfield ―interviewed twenty-six of approximately one hundred
officers in the Narcotics Section‖ using a twenty-six-page questionnaire. Orfield, The 1992 Study, supra note 15, at
79-80.
63
Orfield, The 1987 Study, supra note 15, at 1024-25.
64
Id. at 1051. Of the twenty-six officers interviewed, twenty-one responded to the question about whether police
―shade the facts.‖ Id. at 1050. Of those twenty-one officers, sixteen (76%) agreed that the police do ―shade the facts
a little (or a lot) to establish probable cause when there may not have been probable cause in fact.‖ Id.
65
Id. at 1051.
60
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respondent to admit or deny committing perjury.‖66 Each officer who reviewed the questionnaire
before its widespread distribution ―urged that the questions be eliminated.‖67 In the end, the
researchers deleted the questions.
Although scholars and researchers have uncovered extensive evidence that at least some
police give perjured testimony during suppression hearings to avoid application of the
exclusionary rule, there has been scant study of how judges manage such perjury. Do judges
effectively identify possible police dishonesty? Do they favor the government in close cases?
Do judges try to avoid such credibility determinations by ruling as a matter of law without
deciding credibility?
B. The Limited Study of Judicial Rulings on Police Perjury
A number of researchers have studied the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule in
deterring police misconduct, including its success at reducing police dishonesty such as
―testilying.‖68 A few of those studies include some information about the types of cases in which
defendants filed suppression motions and the corresponding number of motions that judges
granted.69 But the studies focusing on judicial rulings are few and dated, with none taking a
detailed look at the strength of the evidence of police perjury underlying the rulings.

66

Perrin et al, supra note 40, at 718.
Id.
68
See, e.g., supra note 15.
69
See, e.g., Oaks, supra note 15, at 689-96, 681-82 (noting that defendants filed suppression motions most often in
narcotics, gambling, and weapons cases); James E. Spiotto, Search and Seizure, An Empirical Study of the
Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243, 253 (1973) (tracking the trends in a number of
suppression motions filed over extensive periods of time in Chicago before and after Mapp and finding that motions
in serious cases charging murder, burglary and robbery were met with minimal success). Myron Orfield also
reported that evidence was less likely to be suppressed in ―big,‖ important cases than in cases with less severe
offenses. Orfield, The 1992 Study, supra note 15, at 78, 116. Orfield also found that judges rarely excluded
evidence in violent crime cases. Id. at 78. As Orfield noted when discussing empirical studies that preceded his,
studies like Oaks‘s and Spiotto‘s ―may be explained by the efforts of judges to control dramatically increased
narcotics case loads . . . and . . . judges‘ use of suppression as a toll of leniency for relatively minor offenders.‖
Orfield, The 1987 Study, supra note 15, at 1021.
67
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Orfield‘s 1987 study, surveying law enforcement officers, and his 1992 study, surveying
judges and practicing criminal lawyers, compiled opinions about the frequency of police lies in
the suppression context and the impact such lies had on judges‘ willingness to exclude evidence.
Based on his interviews, Orfield concluded ―that judges in Chicago often knowingly credit police
perjury and distort the meaning of the law to prevent the suppression of evidence and assure
conviction.‖70 Orfield‘s interviews revealed that nine out of twelve judges (75%) responding to
questions, fourteen out of fourteen public defenders (100%), and nine out of fourteen prosecutors
(approximately 65%) believed that judges sometimes fail to suppress evidence when they know
police searches are illegal.71
In his similar study of Chicago narcotics officers, 86% of the twenty-six officers
interviewed said that it was ―unusual but not rare‖ for judges to disbelieve police testimony at a
suppression hearing,72 and one officer reported that judges ―never‖ disbelieve police testimony.73
Based on his findings, Orfield believed that regardless of the merits of a defendant‘s argument or
corroborating proof of police dishonesty, judges sometimes intentionally ruled against
defendants, supposedly finding police credible while knowing that police were in fact lying.
Orfield‘s studies relied on small sample sizes and rested on opinions as opposed to concrete

70

Orfield, The 1992 Study, supra note 15, at 75-76. Court respondents believed that judges ―knowingly accept
police perjury as truthful.‖ Id. at 83. Orfield randomly selected fourteen people from forty-one felony trial
courtrooms in the Criminal Division of the Cook County Circuit Court and attempted to interview a judge, an
assistant public defender, and an assistant state‘s attorney assigned to the courtroom. Id. at 81.
71
Id. at 114-15. Of course, illegal searches do not necessarily amount to police perjury, but there appears to be a
correlation between the two.
72
Orfield, The 1987 Study, supra note 15, at 1049.
73
Id.
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data.74 Nevertheless, Orfield‘s findings are especially important because they provide insight
into officers‘, judges‘, and criminal lawyers‘ perceptions (if not the reality) of police perjury. 75
Studies of the manner, effectiveness, and reliability of trial judges‘ decision making on
issues of police credibility are particularly important for the proper and effective application of
the exclusionary rule. The studies cited in this section have shown that some police commit
perjury to avoid application of the rule. Deterrence of unconstitutional police behaviors (and of
police perjury itself) can be accomplished only if judges recognize when police are lying to
conceal unconstitutional conduct and apply the exclusionary rule, accordingly, to bar admission
of tainted evidence. Thus, if police are successfully lying to circumvent the exclusionary rule,
the deterrence value of the rule is destroyed.
II. The Current Study -- Hypotheses, Data Sample, Methodology, and Limits
Based on the findings of prior studies and other extensive anecdotal evidence,76 this study
presupposed that some undetermined percentage of police officers lie about aspects of their
criminal investigations and repeat those lies later in court under oath. In this Part, I explain my
pre-study expectations, the data reviewed during the study, the study‘s methodology, and the
study‘s limits.
A. Hypotheses
Because scholars of, and participants in, the criminal justice system appear to agree that
police perjury occurs with some frequency, I expected my study, which involved a systematic

74

See Perrin et al., supra note 40, at 681 (criticizing Orfield‘s 1984 study because of ―the very limited sample size,‖
which the authors claim ―limits its value and also precludes one from drawing any general conclusions about the
effect of the [exclusionary] rule from [Orfield‘s] results‖).
75
Based on his own observation study, Joseph Grano believed that judges in Philadelphia credited police testimony
in many suppression cases even though the testimony ―seemed incredible.‖ Grano, supra note 52, at 410.
76
See supra note 15; see also Wilson, supra note 17, at 1, 5-15 (cataloging evidence of police lies and providing
multiple examples of video proof of such lies); Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55
(2008) (analyzing the first 200 cases in which DNA evidence exonerated defendants and finding other evidence of
police dishonesty).
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review of orders issued by sitting judges in the District of Kansas, to find that criminal
defendants allege police dishonesty in a substantial number of criminal cases.77 For example, I
expected defendants to assert police dishonesty when they could point to a written police report
conflicting with an officer‘s testimony, when they could produce a video that seemed
inconsistent with such a police report, and when an eyewitness with no relationship to the
defendant would testify favorably for the defense. Nevertheless, because most defendants are
naturally biased, hoping to avoid conviction and punishment, I expected trial judges in the
District of Kansas to regularly rule for the government on issues of credibility by finding
insufficient proof of perjury in close cases with no independent and corroborative evidence.78
At the start of this project, I also hypothesized that defendants would typically allege
police dishonesty when they pursued motions to suppress evidence; after all, prior studies had
found that police lie most often during suppression hearings to avoid the exclusionary rule.79
Also, despite innuendo to the contrary and Orfield‘s study of Chicago‘s state court system
finding the opposite, I expected federal judges, who sit for life and are somewhat insulated from
77

Remember, one prior study showed that a sampling of judges, public defenders, and prosecutors in Chicago
estimated that ―police commit perjury between 20 and 50% of the time they testify on Fourth Amendment issues.‖
Orfield, The 1992 Study, supra note 15, at 83. Because I expected defendants to exercise some restraint in raising
allegations of police dishonesty, I surmised that defendants would assert police dishonesty in about 20% of all
suppression motions that they filed and all arguments that they made in court.
78
Defense lawyers also understand this perceived bias and are likely to advise their clients against raising a police
credibility argument that does not advance the defendant‘s cause because it might, in fact, prove counter-productive.
To test this idea, I asked a highly-experienced federal defender from the District of Kansas to comment on how
often defendants confide to their lawyers that police have lied and how often lawyers advise their clients against
pursuing the issue of police dishonesty. The lawyer indicated that the determinative factor is whether proving
dishonesty can advance the defendant‘s case. The lawyer said that clients ―often‖ say that the police have lied or
were lying. Nevertheless, in only about a quarter of those cases does the lawyer present the issue to the court,
because in many cases, proving that the police lied will not benefit the client. The lawyer offered Franks lies as an
example. In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), the Supreme Court ruled that there is a limited right to
challenge the veracity of a police affidavit, if the challenger‘s allegations are accompanied by an offer of proof. Id.
at 171. But, even if an officer lies in an affidavit in support of a search warrant, the affidavit remains valid unless
the affidavit lacks probable cause when the dishonest parts are removed. Therefore, proving a Franks lie may not
advance a defendant‘s case. Id. at 172 n.8. Since posting this paper on SSRN in January 2010, I have heard from
other defense lawyers across the country. Several have told stories of counterproductive results after raising police
credibility issues before a judge. One defense lawyer insisted that his clients suffer a ―trial tax‖ if, in a bench trial,
the lawyer attempts to challenge police credibility.
79
See supra note 15.
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outside influences, to find police dishonesty in at least a moderate number of cases, especially
where the defense produced independent evidence of police inconsistency suggesting either
police error or fabrication. Because we know that some police do commit perjury, especially in
suppression hearings, I expected that in close cases, judges would at least sometimes err on the
side of caution, ruling for the defense, especially given that the government usually bears the
burden of proof. Understanding that the government bears the burden of proof,80 that officers
typically maintain the ability to accurately document their investigations,81 that police lies are
difficult to establish, that lies can result in the conviction of innocent people,82 and that police
lies often erase constitutionally-guaranteed rights,83 I expected federal trial judges to decide in
favor of the defense in a moderate number of cases. In particular, I expected trial judges to rule
for the defense on police credibility when a motion to suppress or an evidentiary hearing
revealed inconsistencies between and among police statements, when unbiased eyewitness
testimony directly conflicted with police testimony, and when documents or video contradicted
the police.
As detailed in Part III, my hypotheses generally proved incorrect and my expectations for
judges too lofty. Defendants in the Federal District Court of Kansas rarely complained formally
about police dishonesty, and when they did, they sometimes made their claims with extremely
weak or no evidentiary support. Notably though, federal trial judges in Kansas rarely found
police credibility lacking even when defendants presented substantial evidence of significant
police mistakes, and potentially outright lies. In other words, my findings suggest that Irving
80

The government does not bear the burden of proof in cases challenging the truth of statements in an affidavit used
to support a warrant. See Franks, 438 U.S. 154.
81
Police can document the facts with video, audio, and contemporaneous written reports of what occurred and
when, thus gaining a benefit over defendants who lack notice of when a search or seizure will occur.
82
See Garrett, supra note 76.
83
Such rights include Fourth Amendment rights that protect against unreasonable searches and seizures and Fifth
Amendment rights that prohibit compelled self-incrimination.
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Younger was correct—that judges habitually accept the policeman‘s word. The question is
why?84 Are judges in the District of Kansas presuming the credibility of the police? Are
defendants really failing to produce enough evidence to create doubt about police credibility?
Are judges fairly and impartially evaluating the evidence before them, yet finding police
inconsistencies to be innocent mistakes? Part III explores these questions further with the benefit
of this study‘s findings.
B. Data Pool and Methodology
I reviewed 584 orders issued by federal trial judges 85 in criminal86 cases over a twentyfour-month period in the District of Kansas.87 Initially, I reviewed each order to determine
whether there was any reference to police credibility. The review was a full-read review, not a
review for specific words or terms. I chose to read the orders rather than conduct a word search
84

Morgan Cloud has offered five reasons that judges may accept police perjury. First, he argues, police perjury
―can be very difficult to determine.‖ Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43 EMORY L.J. 1311, 1321 (1994).
Second, judges dislike suppressing probative evidence, especially if suppression will result in the freedom of a
guilty defendant. Id. at 1322. Third, some judges believe that most defendants are guilty; thus, it ―is not too
disturbing that evidence will not be suppressed‖ because guilty defendants should be punished. Id. at 1323. Fourth,
judges may assume that as a class, ―criminal defendants will commit perjury‖; therefore, judges credit police
testimony over defendant testimony. Id. at 1323. Finally, Cloud says, ―Judges simply do not like to call other
government officials liars—especially those who appear regularly in court.‖ Id. at 1323-24. On a related topic,
Orfield‘s 1992 study found that judges fail to suppress evidence in serious cases in which the law requires
suppression for three reasons: 1) a personal sense of justice; 2) fear of adverse publicity; and 3) fear that suppression
will ―lead to future difficulty in a judicial election.‖ Orfield, The 1992 Study, supra note 15, at 121. One state court
judge from the Mid-Atlantic who attended a workshop for this paper, offered his own insights, including: 1) judges
need to ―back up‖ any allegations they make that the police have lied; therefore, it is easier to say that the
prosecution has failed to meet its burden of proof than to say that an officer has committed perjury; and 2) if a single
judge is assigned a large geographic territory, he would have to recuse himself from future cases after finding that an
officer lied. Thus for practical reasons, such a recusal would be cumbersome.
85
In this article, trial judges include U.S. magistrate judges as well as district court judges because both groups are
included on the website which forms the data pool for this study.
86
Some of the orders included in this study as criminal cases are actually civil habeas petitions, but I included them
in this analysis because the Kansas District Court identified them as criminal orders and because the petitions
present complaints about the acts or omissions of the police, trial counsel, the trial judge, or some other aspect of a
criminal case.
87
I reviewed all of the orders published in the ―Recent Opinions‖ section on the website for the United States
District Court for the District of Kansas for fiscal years 2008 (from October 1, 2007 through September 30, 2008)
and 2009 (from October 1, 2008 through September 30, 2009). See Welcome to the District of Kansas Internet Site,
https://ecf.ksd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/Opinions.pl?currentYear (last visited Oct. 18, 2010). I chose fiscal years rather
than calendar years because the federal government (including the courts) operates on a fiscal-year basis. The
information I gathered can, therefore, be readily compared to information compiled by federal prosecutors and
reported by the Department of Justice during fiscal years 2008 and 2009.
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in an effort to capture both direct claims of police dishonesty and more subtle claims couched
indirectly in legal arguments or those arguments using words other than the obvious ones, such
as lie, perjury, and credibility. For example, I wanted to account for the possibility that a
defendant might assert that the government was unable to establish probable cause by a
preponderance of the evidence and then support such a claim with evidence contradicting the
officer‘s factual justification for conducting the search or seizure, rather than boldly labeling the
officer a liar.
When my initial review of an order indicated that the defense raised an issue of police
dishonesty, I looked further to discern the details of the claim. If the order failed to provide
context, I used the Pacer system88 to look for additional documents, such as motions, briefs, or
transcripts, giving more details about the defendant‘s dishonesty argument.89 Once all of the
orders addressing police dishonesty were identified, I reviewed those orders to classify the type
of motion that gave rise to the dishonesty claim; for instance, was it a motion to suppress or
motion for a new trial? I also determined whether the case involved drug charges or gun
charges, assessed the type of evidence the defense used to support the argument of police
perjury, charted whether the allegedly offending officer was employed by the county, state, city,
or federal government, identified the judge who ruled on the motion, and attempted to glean any
other information pertinent to the allegation of police dishonesty.
The most difficult point of classification was deciding whether an order raised an indirect
claim of police dishonesty. In deciding whether the defendant was indirectly challenging police

88

Pacer is an on-line system that allows access to all publically-available pleadings filed in federal court for a fee of
$.08 per page.
89
For instance, in United States v. Troxel, 564 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (D. Kan. 2008), see infra Appendix (Case Number
16), I was able to secure a transcript of the motion to suppress proceedings from the judge‘s court reporter. I was
able to obtain a similar transcript from Pacer in United States v. Maldonado, 614 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (D. Kan. 2009),
see infra Appendix (Case Number 26).
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credibility, I looked for signs of conflicts in the evidence, for words such as the government or
officer ―claims,‖ or an allegation that the government was unable to carry its burden, and for any
argument about the insufficiency of the evidence, especially if the assertion were coupled with a
discussion of a conflict in the evidence.
C. Limits
As with all studies, this one has limits. Its greatest limit is, perhaps, the study‘s inability
to connect known lies to judges‘ rulings. This article reports data from federal trial judges‘
rulings on arguments asserting police dishonesty in criminal investigations and prosecutions, as
well as the types of evidence judges reviewed before issuing a decision. Unfortunately, there is
no determinative way to measure when police are telling the truth in a particular case. 90 In fact,
even when there exists overwhelming evidence that the police erred about a fact, we do not know
for sure whether the factual error was an intentional effort to distort the truth or a negligent,
unintentional misjudgment. As a result, this study is necessarily imprecise. Because we are
unable to count the number of lies police tell, I cannot compare that number to the number of
orders in which judges ruled for the government on police credibility when they should have
decided in favor of defendants, or vice versa. But the difficulty in proving lies is also why the
study is important. Lies are usually difficult to identify, especially when the lie is told by a
professional witness such as a police officer. And the fairness and dependability of our current
system of justice relies on the ability of participants, like judges and juries, to effectively decide
when witnesses are lying, mistaken, or telling the truth.
Recognizing that this study cannot produce conclusive answers about how well judges
are executing their roles as truth finders, this article seeks to provide some useful insight on the

90

Cloud, supra note 84, at 1313 (―We know it exists, but it is impossible to determine with any precision how often
it occurs.‖).

23
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1534132

subject and to start a dialogue about how the exclusionary rule should work when some or
significant evidence indicates that police probably engaged in a very costly form of police
misconduct, police perjury. In furtherance of these goals, in Part III, the article establishes a
figurative continuum for orders in the study. That continuum illustrates the relative strength or
weakness of the evidence of police dishonesty and compares those values to the judges‘
accompanying rulings.
A second limit of the study is that, like Orfield‘s and others‘, the study‘s implications are
limited by its narrow focus. For instance, the study looks only at federal court judges, who may
respond differently to allegations of police perjury than do state court judges. Federal judges are
appointed for life and, therefore, avoid re-election attacks that could make them particularly
vulnerable to claims of being ―soft on crime.‖91 They may feel more independence than do their
state counterparts to identify and ―punish‖ officers whom they believe are lying, regardless of the
impact such a ruling may have on an individual case or on an officer‘s career. 92 In constrast,
state court judges, who generally handle a greater number of cases,93 may see the same officers
day in and day out, making it less likely that they will feel comfortable calling an officer a liar in
any one case.94 Furthermore, state court judges sometimes face contentious campaigns to retain

91

See, e.g., Carlos Berdejo & Noam Yuchtman, Crime, Punishment, and Politics: An Analysis of Political Cycles in
Criminal Sentencing, 92 THE REV. OF ECON. & STATISTICS 1, 21 (2010).
92
But see United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (changing original ruling that suppressed
large quantity of drugs after reportedly receiving pressure from the Clinton administration over the initial ruling).
Bayless and other cases suggest that federal judges respond to pressure too. For instance, judges who aspire to move
from the district court to the appellate court may feel such pressure.
93
For instance, more drug cases are prosecuted in state court than in federal court. See, e.g., OFFICE OF NATIONAL
DRUG CONTROL POLICY, DRUG POLICY INFORMATION CLEARINGHOUSE REPORT FOR KANSAS (2008), available at
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/statelocal/ks/ks.pdf (showing that in 2006, the Federal Drug Enforcement
Agency made 255 arrests for drug violations in Kansas while overall, there were 11,937 adult drug arrests in Kansas
during that time).
94
See Cloud, supra note 84, at 1323-24 (noting that ―[j]udges simply do not like to call other government officials
liars–especially those who appear regularly in court‖); see also supra note 84 (discussing one state court judge‘s
view on the risks of ruling on officer perjury).
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their positions on the court.95 Because there are notable differences between the state and federal
judicial systems, the results of this study should not be read to apply equally to state court
judges.
Also, federal judges in Kansas may be more or less likely to acknowledge police lies than
federal judges in different parts of the United States.96

Cultural, population, and political

differences among districts probably affect how comfortable judges feel in addressing police
dishonesty and how likely judges will be to side with the government in doubtful cases. 97 In
small towns, it is not unusual for judges to know and like officers, creating a bias in favor of
officer credibility.98
Moreover, even within a single district, there are police hierarchies that affect police
training and motivation.

―‗[T]he police‘ is not a monolithic entity. There are officers in

positions of command, staff, special assignment (like narcotics detail) and patrol, to name only a
few.‖99 FBI agents, many of whom begin their careers as police officers or other members of
county and state law enforcement, may receive more training and have more experience and
education than city, county, and state officers, who are generally newer to law enforcement and
95

In his study of Chicago‘s criminal justice system, Orfield noted that judges may fail to suppress evidence because
of a desire to avoid adverse publicity or because they fear that suppression will hurt their chances for re-election.
Orfield, The 1992 Study, supra note 15, at 121-122. See also Berdejo & Yuchtman, supra note 91.
96
See Oaks, supra note 15, at 687 (describing differences between the jurisdictions of Chicago and D.C., including
advanced screening of cases by prosecutors in one district but not the other, resulting in a significantly smaller
number of motions to suppress in D.C. than in Chicago).
97
In districts where officers appear repeatedly before the same judge, the judge may be less likely to discredit an
officer‘s testimony. On the other hand, the opposite could also prove true. In a district with a smaller number of
people, once an officer gains a reputation for dishonesty, that reputation may be difficult to overcome and may
spread to other judges by word of mouth outside of the courtroom. This risk may be lessened by the fact that many
districts with large populations maintain multiple offices within the district. For instance, in the Northern District of
Georgia, the U.S. Attorney maintains a presence in the cities of Newnan and Rome, both of which are much smaller
cities than Atlanta, where the U.S. Attorney‘s main office is located.
98
In one case reviewed during this study, a county detective indicated that he had known a particular state court
judge ―a long time,‖ that the judge was one of only two in the area, and that the officer and the judge had worked
together in law enforcement before the latter became a judge. See Transcript of Motion to Suppress Proceedings at
68, 87, United States v. Troxel, 564 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (D. Kan. 2008) (No. 07-20051-JWL). The trial judge had
issued a warrant that was the subject of a suppression motion in federal court. Id.
99
Oaks, supra note 15, at 716.
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paid significantly less. Thus, another limitation of the study is that to the extent the study does
not capture the full spectrum of police conduct, like investigations and testimony by federal,
state, county, and city officers, the study is under-inclusive.100
In addition to its other limits, the study does not account for individual biases. Judges act
according to their own beliefs and prejudices. Therefore, because the sample size is small,101 it
may over or understate judges‘ tolerance of allegations of police lies in general.102
Moreover, while I reviewed hundreds of orders, an order is only a subset of a complete
case. A single case could produce numerous orders. One or more orders in a case could decide a
claim of police credibility; other orders in that same case might not mention the subject. Thus,
even when my review of a given order does not reflect a discussion or claim of dishonesty, I
cannot conclude that the defendant or judge did not discuss police credibility at some other time
during the case. On the other hand, it is likely that when police dishonesty is important to the
defense, whether on suppression or later, the theme will reoccur and, therefore, may be captured
by the review of other orders within a given case.
Finally, although I reviewed all of the publically available orders on the District of
Kansas‘s website, a site designed to provide access to all orders issued in the district, it is likely
that some orders were never posted to the site.

Sealed orders are omitted by definition.

Moreover, according to the Clerk‘s Office, each judge is responsible for ensuring that his or her
orders are uploaded to the site. If an individual judge or his staff fails to post one or more orders,
100

Nevertheless, the study captured investigations by more state, county, and city officers than I thought it would.
Five of the thirty-one judicial orders addressing police dishonesty did not indicate whether the police were federal or
state officers. Eighteen orders identified state, county or city officers. Four orders identified federal officers. Four
orders referenced both state and federal officers.
101
Eight different judges issued orders in response to defendants‘ allegations of police dishonesty. These judges
included: 1) Sam A. Crow; 2) John W. Lungstrum; 3) Kathryn H. Vratil; 4) Wesley E. Brown; 5) Julie A. Robinson;
6) J. Thomas Marten; 7) Karen M. Humphreys; and 8) Richard D. Rogers.
102
Oaks, supra note 15, at 716 (―In this incredibly diverse milieu of different police departments and criminal
justice systems and different individual motivations and sensitivity to sanctions, the researcher must consider not
one but a variety of possible effects . . . some subtle and some obvious.‖).
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those orders will be missed by this study. For example, one district court judge, who was
recently appointed, did not post any orders to the website during the time under review. Thus,
there is no way to quantify the number of orders that may never have been posted.
III.

Findings and Significance of the Current Study
In this Part, I present the findings of my study and then explain how those findings

support Justices Ginsburg and Stevens‘s arguments for a more majestic version of the
exclusionary rule, which considers interests beyond police deterrence.

Part III.A. provides

general information about the types of cases contained in the pool of data. Part III.B includes
specific information about the types of cases in which defendants alleged police dishonesty, the
number of cases in which defendants convinced judges to decide in their favor, and the types and
strength of evidence that defendants presented in support of their arguments.
A. General Findings
In all, the Kansas District Court issued and posted 584 orders during the twenty-fourmonth period studied, from October 1, 2007 through September 30, 2009. Of those 584 orders,
142 resolved issues of pretrial detention.103 The detention orders were typically one or two
pages, and reflected a summary proceeding in which a defendant agreed to detention or the
government proffered ―evidence,‖ after which the judge found sufficient grounds to incarcerate
the defendant pretrial. Not one of these detention orders reflected a dispute about police perjury.
In contrast to the 142 short detention orders, sixty-six of the 584 orders decided motions to
suppress evidence.104

These suppression orders were substantially longer and were often

combined with discovery motions. Twenty-four of the sixty-six suppression orders (about 36%)
alleged unlawful police dishonesty. Habeas petitions, seeking to amend or modify a defendant‘s
103

These were almost always issued by a magistrate judge.
Included in this count of motions to suppress are motions to reconsider the denial of an earlier motion to
suppress.
104
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sentence, also represented a significant number (seventy-two of 584) of motions decided in the
two-year period. Four of the seventy-two orders arguing habeas issues alleged police lies.
Types of Orders Issued in the District of Kansas in
FY 2008 and FY 2009

25%

Detention Orders

Orders on Motions to Suppress
52%

Orders on Habeas Petitions
11%

All Other Orders

12%

Although the 584 orders were issued in a multitude of case types, including cases
charging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, bank robbery,
violations of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, the making of false bomb threats, and fraud counts,
53% of the 584 orders were issued in cases involving drug and gun charges.105

105

In FY 2008, 107 of 280 orders (38%) were issued in drug cases, and in FY 2009, judges ruled on 108 out of 304
(about 36%) motions in cases charging drug violations. Compare the total of 215 orders in drug cases in the twentyfour-month period to figures from the Department of Justice reporting that in FY 2008 14,519 cases of 63,042
(about 23%) charged drug offenses.

28
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1534132

Orders in Drug and Gun Cases in the District of
Kansas in FY 2008 and FY 2009

37%

Drug Cases

47%

Gun cases
Other Types
16%

B. Specific Findings on Police Dishonesty
1. The Numbers
Although there is convincing evidence that police dishonesty, including perjury, is a prevalent
and serious problem, in the District of Kansas, defendants and their lawyers rarely accused
officers of lying.106 Of the 584 orders issued in the twenty-four months under review, only
thirty-one orders (approximately 5% of all orders) resolved an issue of police credibility on the
defense‘s urging.107 Whether defendants or their lawyers privately assert that the police are
prone to lie or that officers have been dishonest about the facts in a given case, 108 they rarely
express that view in Kansas federal court pleadings and hearings. Even excluding the detention

106

Compare these findings with those assertions in Cloud, supra note 84, at 1314 (―Defendants and their lawyers
often are willing to accuse officers of lying, but these claims typically receive little attention beyond the lawsuits in
which the accusations are made.‖); Amir Efrati, Legal System Struggles With How to React When Police Officers
Lie, THE WALL ST. J. (Jan. 29, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123319367364627211.html ( ―[O]ne of the
most common accusations by defendants and defense attorneys‖ is that ―police officers don‘t tell the truth on the
witness stand.‖).
107
Other than the Maldonado case, see discussion infra pp. 46-51, in which the defendant indirectly suggested
police dishonesty and the judge appeared to doubt police credibility on his own, there were no orders indicating that
a judge raised an issue of police dishonesty sua sponte.
108
See Efrati, supra note 106.
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orders, which were the product of summary proceedings, none of which reflected a discussion of
police credibility, defendants asserted police dishonesty only 7% of the time.

Orders Addressing Police Dishonesty in the District
of Kansas in FY 2008 and FY 2009
7%

Orders Addressing Police
Dishonesty
Orders With No
Discussion of Police
Dishonesty
93%

Usually the defendant will know when the police have lied; therefore, this finding could mean
that police dishonesty rarely occurs in the District of Kansas. The finding might also reflect that
prosecutors are screening out many of the cases with the strongest evidence of police dishonesty,
refusing to pursue charges in those cases. On the other hand, even if the defendant knows that
officers have falsified police reports, lied in affidavits to secure a warrant, or committed perjury
in a hearing to justify a search in which the defendant‘s constitutional rights were violated, she
may forego an argument of police dishonesty in court. If the defense is convinced that such an
argument is unlikely to advance her cause, because of the defendant‘s inherent bias, because of
lack of corroborative proof, because she perceives judges generally or this particular judge as
pro-government, or because the prosecutor will withhold a sentencing benefit of acceptance of
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responsibility if the defendant pursues a pretrial motion (such as a motion to suppress), a
defendant may withhold dishonesty arguments, even when the police have, in fact, lied.
Also, because it is generally viewed as ―indelicate‖ to call any witness a liar, 109 let alone a
police witness, defendants may reserve police dishonesty as a last resort defense, asserting it only
if they have no other legitimate or persuasive argument. This inference is logical given that even
when defendants claimed that the police lied, about 42% of the time they did so in subtle and
indirect ways without using words such as lie, perjury, dishonest, or false. Of the thirty-one
cases in which the defense argued that police lied during some portion of a case, thirteen of the
arguments were couched in language or legal arguments that implied police dishonesty without
actually saying that an officer perjured herself or lacked credibility. For instance, in one case 110
the defendant asserted a violation of Miranda, claiming that he did not speak English well
enough to understand or waive his rights, while also making a Fourth Amendment argument,
contending that police lacked probable cause for a stop of his vehicle, despite an officer‘s
citation of the defendant for driving his truck over the ―fog line.‖ 111 The defendant never
directly said that the police lied about his waiver of Miranda rights, although the implication
seemed clear. The Court appeared to understand this implication. On the Miranda issue, the
Court found: ―[D]efendant‘s claimed inability to understand English is belied by the evidence
and testimony. First, Trooper Henderson testified that defendant fully understood English . . .
.‖112

109

Cloud, supra note 84, at 1324 (noting also that many trial lawyers think it is a ―tactical mistake to call any
witness a liar–unless the lie is palpable and the witness is unsavory‖).
110
United States v. Perales, No. 08-40055-JAR, 2008 WL 4974807 (Nov. 19, 2008); see infra Appendix (Case
Number 21).
111
The fog line divides the driving lane from the shoulder of the road.
112
Perales, 2008 WL 4974807.
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Maybe defendants choose subtlety because calling someone a liar is considered rude. 113
Maybe defense lawyers believe that their clients have the greatest chance of winning a motion
using a legal argument, instead of directly claiming police perjury. Perhaps defense lawyers
believe, as did Irving Younger, that judicial recognition of police dishonesty is so uncommon
that it will rarely advance the defendant‘s cause to assert police lies, unless the proof is
overwhelming.114 Or, maybe defense lawyers fail to adequately investigate claims of police
dishonesty and are left with a lack of evidence of police scienter.115
Regardless of their reasons, very few defendants asserted police dishonesty in court, and
in the period studied, approximately 42% of the time, defendants couched the few police
dishonesty arguments they made in vague, polite, legal arguments or in indirect ways, without
using words such as perjury, falsify, scienter, or lie. Because our legal system is an adversarial
one, I do not expect judges to look for police lies when the defendant has failed to allege police
dishonesty. Lack of such arguments may suggest that defense lawyers bear some of the blame
for judges‘ tendency to regularly rule for the police.
Nevertheless, even if defense lawyers share some responsibility, their failure to assert the
issues frequently does not explain judges‘ reluctance to accept the arguments that are made. Of
the thirty-one orders discussing police dishonesty (see Appendix, detailing each of the thirty-one
orders), only two orders found that an officer lied during a hearing or falsified material
information in an affidavit.116

113

See Cloud, supra note 84, at 1324.
See supra note 21.
115
This lack of investigation could result from lack of resources, too many cases to investigate, cynicism about
defendants‘ claims of police dishonesty, or cynicism about the chance of convincing a judge, among other reasons.
116
In a third order, the trial judge ruled that the government had failed to carry its burden of proof but did not find
police dishonesty. See United States v. Burtin, No. 07-10111-01-WEB (D. Kan. Dec. 18, 2007); infra Appendix
(Case Number 6).
114
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Because there is no sure method of establishing that police have lied, we cannot know if
trial judges in the District of Kansas, like Orfield alleged of judges in Chicago, are ―pretend[ing]
to believe police officers who they know are lying.‖117 Maybe officers in the District of Kansas
tell fewer lies than officers tell in other parts of the country, such as Illinois and New York.
Maybe prosecutors in Kansas refuse to prosecute cases when they suspect police dishonesty.
Maybe judges in this district are astute at identifying lies, and accurately recognized police
perjury in every case in which such lying occurred during the time studied. But the low
percentages of orders finding police perjury support Irving Younger‘s belief that ―judicial
recognition of [police perjury] is extremely rare‖118 and his claim that judges ―habitually accept[]
the policeman‘s word.‖119 Notably, Myron Orfield‘s study concluded that police perjury may
occur in 22 to 53% of suppression matters in Chicago.120

In the study, 92% of judges,

prosecutors and defense lawyers who participated believed that police lie in court to avoid
suppression at least ―some of the time,‖ and 22% thought police lie more than half of the time
when they testify in relation to Fourth Amendment issues.121
Although the District of Kansas does not contain a city as big as Chicago, and there is no
additional proof that police in Kansas lie with the same regularity as Orfield found in that city,
the difference between the percentage of police lies Orfield found and the percentage that Kansas
judges identified is staggering. If police perjury occurs in Kansas at a rate of 22%, which is the

117

See Orfield, The 1992 Study, supra note 15, at 75-76; see also DERSHOWITZ, supra note 20, at xxi.
See Younger, supra note 21, at 41.
119
Id.
120
Orfield‘s figures related to police lies told under oath during suppression hearings, not to other types of
proceedings (like trials) and false statements in police affidavits. Orfield, The1992 Study, supra note 15, at 107.
More specifically, Orfield‘s study showed that public defenders in Chicago believed that police lie 53% of the time
and that 22% of all respondents opined that police lie more than half of the time. Orfield‘s earlier study revealed
that 95% of responding officers believed that officers sometimes lie in court to avoid the suppression of evidence.
Orfield, The 1987 Study, supra note 15, at 1050 n.130.
121
Public defenders thought police perjury occurred 53% of the time police testify about Fourth Amendment
matters. Orfield, The 1992 Study, supra note 15, at 107.
118
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lower end of the figures the Chicago study found, then federal trial judges in Kansas are
facilitating perjury, consciously or subconsciously.122 Kansas trial judges found police lies in
less than half of 1% of all of the Kansas District Court orders studied. They identified police
perjury in only 8% of cases in which suppression hearings were held, and they agreed with
defendants in less than 7% of all cases claiming police perjury.123
Number of Orders Accepting Allegations of Perjury
in the District of Kansas in FY 2008 and FY 2009
7%

Orders Rejecting Defendants'
Claims of Police Dishonesty

Orders Accepting Defendants'
Arguments of Police
Dishonesty
93%

Although trial judges in Kansas identified very few police lies, the lies that judges did
detect and the circumstances in which defendants asserted such perjury are consistent with
Orfield‘s belief that police perjury occurs most often in suppression matters. 124 Like Orfield‘s
study of Chicago, this study found that motions challenging searches and seizures accounted for
a substantial portion of the cases in which defendants in Kansas claimed that police lied. Of the
thirty-one cases asserting police dishonesty, twenty-six (approximately 84%) involved
122

Although this study is not confined to suppression matters, as was Orfield‘s, Orfield‘s findings are still
significant because, as explained later, this study also determined that a large percentage of defendants‘ claims of
police dishonesty arise in suppression matters. Thus, rejection of these claims by Kansas judges would tend to
encourage police to lie in the suppression context.
123
As Orfield noted in his 1992 Study, ―it is not clear whether judges‘ unwillingness to suppress evidence . . . is an
entirely conscious process.‖ Orfield, 1992 Study, supra note 15, at 121.
124
See Orfield, The 1987 Study, supra note 15, at 1050-51; Orfield, The 1992 Study, supra note 15, at 83. The
findings from this study also coincide with Professor Slobogin‘s (and other scholars‘) intuition that ―the most
common venue for testilying is the suppression hearing.‖ See Slobogin, supra note 16.
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challenges to a search, a seizure, or both.125 In five cases (approximately 16%), a defendant
asserted both a violation of search and seizure law and a breach of Miranda or Fifth Amendment
rights. In only five of thirty-one cases (16%) a defendant asserted police dishonesty in a context
other than search or seizure.126
Orders Ruling on Alleged Police Dishonesty in Search and
Seizure Context
16%

Orders Addressing Police Dishonesty
in the Context of a Challenge to
Search and Seizure

Orders Addressing Police Dishonesty
Outside the Search and Seizure
Context
84%

The findings from this study of Kansas judges are also consistent with Dallin Oaks‘s
1969 study in which he concluded that illegal searches and seizures occurred primarily in
weapons and drug cases.127

Of the thirty-one orders discussing police lies, twenty-two

(approximately 71%) were issued in ―drug‖ cases.

Although defendants asserted police

125

Twenty-five of those twenty-six cases (approximately 96%), involved a claim that the unlawful search or seizure
violated the Fourth Amendment; in the remaining case, the defendant claimed that the unlawful search violated Title
III, which governs wire taps.
126
One defendant claimed that a detective testified falsely during trial while authenticating the defendant‘s voice on
a taped phone call. United States v. Parker, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (D. Kan. 2007). See infra Appendix (Case
Number 3). One defendant contended that agents attributed too many grams of methamphetamine to him for
purposes of sentencing. United States v. Burtin, No. 07-10111-01-WEB (D. Kan. Dec. 18, 2007). See infra
Appendix (Case Number 6). One claimed that an agent lied at trial about the defendant‘s post-arrest statements.
United States v. Ndiaye, No. 05-40017-02-SAC, 2008 WL 4066339 (Aug. 28, 2008). See infra Appendix (Case
Number 15). A fourth defendant alleged that an agent testified in a way that attributed a greater quantity of Ecstacy
to the defendant than was accurate. United States v. Nguyen, No. 08-10002-03-WEB, 2008 WL 5095996 (Nov. 26,
2008). See infra Appendix (Case Number 22). A fifth defendant asserted police dishonesty and corruption in the
context of a habeas petition, alleging that a corrupt officer tainted the investigation in the defendant‘s drug case.
United States v. Johnson, No. 03-40139-01-JAR, 2009 WL 2043496 (Jul. 14, 2009). See infra Appendix (Case
Number 27).
127
See Oaks, supra note 15, at 682.
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dishonesty more often in drug cases than in any other type, drug offenses make up only about
23% of all federal offenses prosecuted by U.S. attorneys across the nation.128 Gun cases were
the second most popular for claims of police perjury. Ten of thirty-one orders discussed police
dishonesty in cases charging the defendant with a ―gun‖ crime—possessing a firearm as a
convicted felon, possessing a gun while unlawfully using drugs, or committing a robbery or gang
violence using a firearm. Although defendants asserted police dishonesty in gun cases at a
significantly higher rate than they asserted dishonesty in other, non-drug cases, gun cases
constitute only about 6% of federal prosecutions in a given year.129 Moreover, four orders
decided perjury issues in cases charging both drug and gun offenses.130
Orders Addressing Allegations of Police Dishonesty in
Gun and Drug Cases
10%

Cases Charging Drug Crimes
(But No Gun Charges)
13%

Cases Charging Gun Crimes
(But No Drug Charge)
Cases Charging Both Gun and
Drug Crimes
Cases With No Gun or Drug
Crimes Charged

58%
19%

128

See SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE, CRIMINAL CASES FILED AND DISPOSED OF AND
NUMBER OF DEFENDANTS HANDLED BY U.S. ATTORNEYS FOR FY 2008,
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t572008.pdf.
129
See Bureau of Justice Statistics, SUSPECTS ARRESTED FOR FEDERAL OFFENSES AND BOOKED BY THE U.S.
MARSHALS SERVICE, BY OFFENSE, OCTOBER 1, 2004 – SEPTEMBER 30, 2005, available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/fjsst/2005/tables/fjs05st101.cfm (indicating that for Fiscal Year 2006, only
6.2% of cases were weapon offenses). Notably, in this study, approximately 37% of the 584 orders issued were
issued in cases involving drug charges. See supra Part III.A.
130
Two of the orders were issued in cases alleging violations of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act; the other was a case
charging the defendant with making a false bomb threat.
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The findings of this study show that the issues of police perjury are not flooding the
courts. Instead, police perjury is rarely asserted. When matters of police credibility do arise,
such issues typically surface in the suppression context, in which judges exercise complete
control over credibility findings. Although defendants are not quick to claim that police have
lied, judges rarely accept the arguments defendants do make. Of thirty-one orders discussing
police dishonesty (see Chart, Appendix), only two ruled for the defendant, finding that an officer
lied during a hearing or falsified material information in an affidavit.131
2. The Evidence Underlying the Numbers.
If judges are effectively identifying and managing police perjury within the suppression
context, then in Kansas and elsewhere, judges are playing a pivotal role in deterring and
neutralizing potentially devastating police dishonesty because the vast majority of allegations of
police dishonesty occur in that context, where judges, not jurors, decide credibility. In addition,
if judges are effectively managing police dishonesty at the suppression stage of a case, the
Supreme Court majority‘s vision for the exclusionary rule is probably resulting in the proper
balance of deterrence, truth-finding, and effective law enforcement. To further evaluate whether
judges are making this type of contribution to the ideal of a fair and impartial justice system, this
section analyzes each of the thirty-one cases in which a Kansas trial judge decided a police
credibility issue. Each case is then placed on a figurative continuum reflecting this author‘s posthoc analysis of the strength or weakness of the evidence underlying the claim of dishonesty.
Because lies combine inaccuracy with difficult-to-probe intent to distort the truth, the
most diligent and fair-minded judge might mistake a lie for an inaccuracy. But we know from
other studies, police admissions, highly publicized incidents of police corruption caught on
131

In a third order, the trial judge ruled that the government had failed to carry its burden of proof but did not find
police dishonesty. See United States v. Burtin, No. 07-10111-01-WEB (D. Kan. Dec. 18, 2007). See infra
Appendix (Case Number 6).
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video, and many other sources, that police officers do lie. As a result, judges must begin to think
critically about the probability in a given case that an officer is lying. Given that lies are difficult
to prove, judges should pay special attention in cases with evidence of significant inaccuracies,
particularly if the source of that evidence is an unbiased witness, tangible evidence, or evidence
corroborated by multiple sources.
For purposes of this study, each of the thirty-one credibility cases is considered in terms
of the weight of the evidence. Thus, easy cases rest on each end of the police dishonesty
continuum.

An extreme example of a case involving overwhelming evidence of police

dishonesty would be a case like the recently publicized incident in Hollywood, Florida, in which
officers were seen and heard on video discussing how they intended to write a false police report
and take distorting pictures to make an automobile accident look as though the defendant had
caused it, even though one of the police officers was at fault in the crash.132
In contrast to this end of the figurative spectrum that signifies the highly probable police
lie, the opposite end marks highly doubtful police dishonesty.

On this end would sit the

hypothetical case in which an officer testifies clearly and without contradiction and those cases
in which audio, video, and other evidence corroborate the officer‘s resolute testimony.
Working from cases with the weakest evidence of police dishonesty and the lowest
probability of perjury to the most probable, the thirty-one Kansas cases break down this way: in
six of thirty-one (about 19%) in which defendants alleged police perjury,133 the defense failed to
produce any (or almost any) evidence to support the claim. These six cases were undoubtedly
decided correctly on the dishonesty issue. Whether or not the police engaged in deception or
perjury, no reasonable judge or jury could have logically concluded that the police had, because
132

Todd Wright, Charges Dropped Against Woman Framed by Cops, NBC MIAMI, July 29, 2009,
http://www.nbcmiami.com/news/local-beat/Cops-Set-Up-Woman-After-Crash.html
133
Sometimes perjury is alleged directly; other times it is alleged indirectly.
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evidence of mistakes, let alone intentional distortion, was lacking. These cases, which include
Case Numbers 1, 3, 5, 10, 15 and 21,134 see Chart, Appendix, fall on the left side of the
continuum, marking cases with weak evidence of police perjury.
In the remaining twenty-five cases (of the thirty-one total) in which the defense raised a
claim of police perjury, there was at least some evidentiary support, even if that evidence
consisted solely of the defendant‘s own testimony. Nevertheless, in one of these twenty-five
cases, the defendant‘s evidence was especially weak and the government‘s evidence substantial.
In Case Number 28, see Chart Appendix, two officers testified and the government produced a
video that corroborated their testimony. Thus, the trial judge reached the correct result from an
evidentiary standpoint. The defendant‘s evidence of perjury was simply no match for the
government‘s evidence. Thus, in seven of thirty-one cases (about 23%) in which Kansas federal
trial judges decided police credibility, they appeared to reach a result demanded by the evidence.
Correspondingly, these seven cases give no support for Orfield‘s finding that judges ―knowingly

134

In three of the six cases (Numbers 5, 10, and 15) in which the defendant produced no supporting evidence of
police dishonesty, the defendant was unrepresented by counsel. In two of the three cases (Numbers 3 and 21) in
which the defendant was represented, the attorney appeared to accede to raising the police credibility issue either
without sufficient supporting evidence or despite the posture of the case that made credibility an irrelevant issue. In
Case Number 3, the defendant challenged the credibility of an officer who testified at defendant‘s trial. The judge
rejected the claim, noting that the jury had decided credibility as part of its verdict. United States v. Parker, 521 F.
Supp. 2d 1174, 1176 (D. Kan. 2007). In Case Number 21, the lawyer raised police credibility without proof and in
the face of video evidence of a traffic stop that corroborated the government‘s version of events. In the one
remaining case (Case Number 1) in which the defendant was represented by counsel and raised an issue of police
dishonesty, yet produced no evidence, it appears that the lawyer wanted to argue lack of probable cause without
asserting police dishonesty, but the defendant would not yield the dishonesty point at the hearing. At the evidentiary
hearing on his motion to suppress, the defendant argued that the magistrate issuing the warrant was misled by
information in the police affidavit that the officer knew to be false. According to the judge: ―At the hearing, the
defendant opposed the introduction of evidence clarifying that he was not challenging the affiant‘s actual or
constructive knowledge of the truthfulness of matters . . . in the affidavit.‖ United States v. Harvey, 514 F. Supp. 2d
1257, 1261 (D. Kan. 2007). Thus, reading between the lines, the defendant believed that the police had lied in a
sworn affidavit, but the defendant‘s lawyer thought the best chance of success on the motion to suppress rested with
a legal argument. See infra Appendix (Case Number 1) (stating that defendant ―summarily argue[d]‖ the police lies
point but ―fail[ed] to identify what information . . . was misleading . . . and was known . . . to be false.‖); infra
Appendix (Case Number 13) (stating that defendant ―made no offer of proof that Officer Garman misrepresented her
criminal history‖); infra Appendix (Case Number 14) (―While defendant denies committing this [traffic] infraction
in his motion, he has offered no such proof.‖).
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credit police perjury and distort the meaning of the law to prevent the suppression of evidence
and assure conviction.‖
Weakest
Evidence of
Police
Dishonesty

Strongest
Evidence of
Police
Dishonesty

31 Total Cases

Percent & Number of Cases
4%

48%

6

1

15

9

No/Almost
No Evidence

Thin
Evidence

Competing
Evidence

Substantial
Evidence

Cases 1, 3,
5, 10, 15, 21

Case 28

Cases 6, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 17, 19,
20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 29, 31

Cases 2, 4, 8, 12,
16, 18, 26, 27, 30

19%

29%

In an additional fifteen (of the thirty-one total) cases (about 48%), the evidence was
competing and could have been decided for either the police or the defense, depending on who
was burdened with proving (or disproving) a lie and by what percentage of persuasiveness.
These Cases included Numbers 6, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 17, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 29, and 31, Chart,
Appendix. In several of these fifteen cases, the defendant testified to police dishonesty. 135 In
some of them, the defendant offered testimony from an eyewitness. Sometimes the witness was
easily impeached as biased because he or she was related to, acquainted with, or employed by the
defendant.136 In other cases, the witness appeared to have no obvious bias for the defense but

135

In Case Number 7, the defendant testified that officers entered the curtilage of his home to take and search his
trash. The police testified, to the contrary, that the trash they took and searched fell outside the defendant‘s fence in
an area that typically is used for sidewalk, where trash is collected. The officers also produced a picture of the
general area, demonstrating where the curb sat in relation to the fencing and home. In Case Number 13, defendant
claimed that police lied about her criminal history in an affidavit to obtain a wire tap of her phone. In Case Number
14, the defendant denied that he committed any traffic infractions leading to a stop and search of his car. In Case
Number 22, the defendant testified that officers had attributed to him more Ecstacy pills than he had possessed. In
Case Number 25, the defendant claimed that officers distorted and withheld information obtained from a
cooperating witness to obtain a search warrant for his home.
136
In Case Number 9, two officers gave consistent testimony about how they uncovered a gun hidden on the
defendant. The defendant offered a witness who lived in the apartment complex where the defendant was arrested.
The eyewitness contradicted the officers‘ version of arrest and said that the defendant had found the gun in a
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exhibited no particular characteristics of reliability or persuasiveness either. 137 In one of these
fifteen cases, the trial judge never reached the police credibility issue but ruled for the defense
for other legal reasons.138 In two of the fifteen cases, common sense seemed to support the
defense‘s version of events.139 Regardless of the type of evidence the defendant produced, in

mailbox just before police arrived. In Case Number 11, the defendant offered his wife‘s statement that officers told
her that she would be released from her arrest and that her infant child, who was with her at the time of the arrest,
would not be turned over to children‘s services if the wife agreed to cooperate with police, including consenting to a
search of her home, which she shared with the defendant. In Case Numbers 19 and 20, charging environmental
crimes, the defendants offered testimony from a contractor that worked for their companies. The contractor testified
to his normal routine which contradicted the officer‘s testimony about the happenings at the time of his inspection of
the defendants‘ equipment.
137
In Case Number 17, the defendant introduced testimony from an eyewitness, an inmate at Phillips County Jail,
who watched officers use a drug dog to sniff defendant‘s car. The witness testified that he did not observe the dog
react to the car. In Case Number 24, the defendant produced an affidavit, but no live testimony, from a citizen
witness who provided an alibi for defendant‘s whereabouts. That testimony contradicted an officer‘s affidavit used
to obtain a warrant to search the defendant‘s home. In Case Number 31, the defendant‘s wife testified in direct
contradiction to an officer. The officer claimed to have seen the defendant hiding a ―long gun‖ when he emerged
from his home. The wife testified that the defendant had been holding a phone in one hand but nothing, and
certainly not a gun or rifle, in the other. In all, I identified seven orders reflecting witnesses other than a police
officer or the defendant: Case Number 9 (two officers testified for the government; defendant called an eyewitness
to testify on his behalf); Case Number 17 (two deputies testified that dog alerted on defendant‘s car; defendant
introduced an eyewitness who testified that he did not see dog alert); Case Number 19 (defendant called contract
pumper as witness to dispute agent‘s testimony that he could see into open heater/treater); Case Number 20 (same as
Case Number 19); Case Number 24 (defendant offered alibi witness contradicting officer‘s statements in an
affidavit); Case Number 29 (a citizen witness testified for the defendant and contradicted two officers‘ testimony);
and Case Number 31 (two officers testified for the government and defendant‘s wife, who was an eyewitness,
testified for defendant). None of these witnesses convinced the trial judge that the police lacked credibility. See
infra Appendix.
138
In Case Number 6, the defendant implied that the police lied about the amount of drugs he possessed and
objected to a sentence based on 8.58 grams of methamphetamine the government attributed to the defendant. The
trial judge did not reach the perjury issue but concluded that the government had failed to provide sufficient
evidentiary support to include that amount of drugs in defendant‘s relevant conduct for sentencing purposes.
139
In Case Number 11, the defendant, who had been arrested after his wife consented to a search of their home,
produced evidence that his wife consented after she was arrested in the presence of her infant daughter and was told
by officers that she could avoid prosecution and avoid losing her child to child welfare services if she allowed the
search. The officers denied making such threats, but common sense suggests that they probably did tell the wife that
unless she cooperated with the investigation, the infant child would be taken from her, at least temporarily, while she
was transported, booked, and held in jail. What else could the police do with the infant upon arrest of the wife?
Similarly, in Case Number 29, police testified that they went to the defendant‘s home to conduct a ―knock and talk.‖
Finding the defendant not at home, they talked with a woman (who was later identified as defendant‘s mother or
mother in law) and asked her permission to search the house. There was competing testimony from the woman and
the officers. Part of the officers‘ testimony defied common sense. For instance, when the woman supposedly
invited the officers into the home, one officer testified that he asked to move from the kitchen, according to the
officer a potentially dangerous area for a knock and talk, although he admitted that the woman posed no danger to
the officers. When the officer asked to move to another area of the house, the officer claimed that the woman took
him into a room with marijuana lying out in plain view. See United States v. Ridley, 639 F. Supp. 2d 1235, (D. Kan.
2009). According to the officer, having allowed the officers to see the drugs in plain view, the woman, nevertheless,
denied their request to search the home. Id. In addition, the two officers gave diverging testimony on one important
point. The second officer never heard the first ask to move to another room from the kitchen. The woman,

41
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1534132

none of these fifteen cases did the trial judge credit the defendant‘s argument that the police had
lied.
Because the evidence was competing in each of these cases, I cannot conclude that judges
consciously favored the government while knowing or believing that an officer lied under oath.
But given that the government usually bears the burden of proof by at least a preponderance of
the evidence,140 what accounts for the judges awarding every tie in the evidence to the
government? Because in these cases the amount and type of the evidence seemed equally
balanced or slightly more favorable to the defendant, at least in some cases, the judges must have
granted the government the benefit of the doubt. In other words, the judges must have presumed
that officers were telling the truth, even when there was equal or even significant reason to doubt
their credibility. Or, the judges must have, at least occasionally, ruled for the government while
suspecting that the police were in fact mistaken or lying.
What about the remaining nine of thirty-one cases (about 29%) in which the defendant
contended that police lied? In each, the defendant produced substantial evidence of at least one
significant false statement by police, suggesting that police committed an extensive error or
committed perjury. In nine cases, Case Numbers 2,141 4,142 8,143 12,144 16,145 18,146 26,147 27,148

apparently, with some hesitation and inconsistency in her own testimony, said that she felt forced by the officers‘
authority to leave the kitchen and allow them into other parts of the home.
140
Except for cases involving ―Franks‖ challenges, in which the defendant bears the burden by a preponderance.
141
In Case Number 2, the defendant claimed that police entered his home without a warrant. The defendant called a
police witness during the hearing on his motion to suppress. The officer testified that the defendant had committed a
probation violation and admitted that his police report incorrectly said that the defendant had committed a parole
violation. The government failed to produce the disputed warrant at the hearing. Nevertheless, after criticizing the
government for its failure to produce the warrant, the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence, based on
officer testimony, that the warrant did exist at the time of the search.
142
In Case Number 4, the defendant produced evidence that the police possessed numerous documents showing that
the residence they intended to search was not owned by the defendant; yet, they obtained a warrant for defendant‘s
home and searched it. The trial judge expressly acknowledged that the police affidavit contained false statements
about ownership of the home searched but attributed the false statements to police inadvertence, not intentional
deception.
143
In Case Number 8, an officer claimed that he looked in a car at defendant‘s insistence to find the defendant‘s
identification and observed a baggie of cocaine in plain view on the floorboard of the car. Defendant denied that the
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and 30,149 the defendant produced evidence through his or her own testimony, the testimony of
eyewitnesses, an effective cross-examination of the government‘s witnesses, and/or with
documents or video, that was consistent with police perjury. In fairness, however, in all but one
of these nine cases, the evidence that the defendant presented was also consistent with police
negligence or innocent mistake.

Eight of these nine perjury allegations were raised in

conjunction with the defendant‘s motion to suppress.
In the nine cases in which the defendant produced substantial evidence of police perjury,
the Kansas trial judges ruled for the defendant twice on the issue of suppression and for the
government in six cases. In both cases in which the trial judge suppressed evidence, he also
specifically found police not credible. In a third case out of the nine with the strongest evidence
of police dishonesty, the judge completely avoided the credibility determination but ruled for the
government as a matter of law. Thus, even when the defendant produced substantial evidence of
at least one significant false statement by police, trial judges in the District of Kansas heavily
cocaine was in plain view or on the floorboard. Common sense also suggests that the officer‘s testimony was
doubtful. The judge avoided the issue, ruling that a search of the car, which would have been justified by the
defendant‘s post-search arrest, was a search incident to arrest and thus mooted the police dishonesty issue.
144
In Case Number 12, the defendant alleged that he invoked his right to a lawyer after arrest but that officers
violated the invocation by later interrogating him about the same robberies for which he invoked. The officers gave
conflicting testimony at the hearing on defendant‘s motion to suppress. The judge recognized the conflict between
the officers‘ testimony but attributed the conflict to one officer‘s ―misrecollection rather than some effort to hide
some coercion.‖
145
In Case Number 16, there were significant inconsistencies among the officers‘ testimony. Ultimately, the trial
judge determined that there was evidence of knowing and intentional omissions from the affidavit submitted in
support of a search warrant.
146
In Case Number 18, the defendant claimed that police lied about the factual basis for a warrant to search his
home. He produced video evidence obtained from the police department that disputed time and events that police
presented in support of the warrant, including that the defendant was at the police station at 5:34. The affidavit said
that the defendant was at the station at 6:12. The trial judge rejected the defendant‘s perjury argument, indicating
that the defendant had failed to establish that the false statement was made intentionally.
147
In Case Number 26, the defendant called two police witnesses to create inconsistencies in the government‘s one
police witness‘s testimony. Eventually, the judge found the police witnesses lacking in credibility.
148
In Case Number 27, the defense highlighted numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of two officers. There
were also discrepancies between the officers‘ testimony and the dispatch record. The court rejected the argument
that the numerous contradictions and inconsistencies established police perjury.
149
In Case Number 30, a pro se defendant alleged that his case was tainted because it was investigated by an officer
who was later dismissed from the police department and criminally prosecuted for misconduct. Without holding a
hearing, the judge declared that the defendant had failed to demonstrate misconduct in his particular case.
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favored the government and usually concluded that any false statements by police resulted from
unintentional mistakes.
Accordingly, defendants formally claimed police perjury in thirty-one cases during the
twenty-four months studied. Of these thirty-one dishonesty arguments, seven (23%) had no
chance to succeed. In those cases, defendants produced little or no evidence to support their
claims. In fifteen of thirty-one cases, (approximately 50%) in which defendants directly or
indirectly claimed that police lied in the investigation or prosecution of their case, the defendant
supported his allegations with at least some evidence and created a plausible dispute about police
credibility.

Nevertheless, in each of these fifteen cases, the defendant‘s evidence was

impeachable for bias or otherwise. In all but one of these fifteen debatable cases, the trial judge
ruled for the government on the issue of police credibility. In the one remaining case of fifteen,
the judge avoided the credibility issue but ruled as a matter of law for the defendant, finding that
the government had failed to carry its burden of proof on a disputed sentencing issue. In the
remaining nine cases of thirty-one, defendants produced a substantial amount of evidence to
prove that police made at least one false statement under oath. The trial judge found police not
credible in only two of nine cases. In one additional case, the judge avoided the credibility issue.
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Strength of Evidence in Support of
Police Dishonesty

23%

Evidence Very Weak or Nonexistent

29%

Evidence Competing

Evidence Substantial
48%

What was so persuasive about the defendant‘s evidence in the two cases in which judges
found police credibility lacking? The trial judge found police dishonesty in Case Number 16,
United States v. John D. Troxel, and Case Number 26, United States v. Jose Maldonado. In
both, an aggressive cross-examination by defense counsel150 emphasized inconsistencies between
and among the testimony of police officers. In Maldonado, there were inconsistencies in three
officers‘ in-court testimony and between the officers‘ testimony and their written police reports.
In Troxel, two officers told a different story during a hearing than one of the officers had
previously told a state court judge in a sworn affidavit for a search warrant. In neither case did
the defendant testify. In neither did the defense call civilian witnesses to contradict police. In
neither did the defendant‘s advocate produce video evidence.

Contrary to the type of

independent and corroborative evidence I expected to see, see Hypotheses, Part II.A., the
evidence that persuaded judges of police perjury rested with the statements of police themselves.
The details of Cases 16 and 26 follow.

150

The lawyer in Maldonado was a member of the Federal Public Defender‘s Office in Wichita; the defense lawyer
in Troxel was a retained attorney.
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In Case Number 16 (Troxel), the defendant challenged the veracity of testimony from two
police officers, explaining a warrantless search of the defendant‘s home.151 The defendant also
attacked the truth of statements in an officer‘s affidavit. Police had used the affidavit to obtain a
search warrant from a state court judge and to conduct a second, subsequent search of the
defendant‘s home.152
First, the federal trial judge found a Fourth Amendment violation during a search of the
defendant‘s ―gun room‖ within his mobile home.153

According to the judge, while the

defendant‘s wife gave officers consent to look for her husband in their mobile home, she ―did not
have authority to consent to the search of the ‗gun room,‘‖ and Mr. Troxel could ―not possibly
have been found inside [a small] cooler [officers searched].‖154
The judge also found false statements in the police affidavit ―based on the evidence at the
March 17, 2008 hearing.‖155 According to the judge, testimony of the officers during the hearing
contradicted statements in the affidavit. The lead officer on the investigation testified that he
conducted a complete search of defendant‘s mobile home for drugs before seeking a search
warrant. The affidavit, however, made the search out to be a cursory, ―walk-through‖ search.156
Also, the officer testified that he did not field test residue that he suspected to be

151

Motion to Suppress Evidence and Memorandum of Law in Support at ¶¶ 11, 12, and 13, United States v. Troxel,
564 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (D. Kan. 2008) (No. 07-20051-JWL).
152
Id. at 21 (―Fact (2) is incorrect on several accounts. . . . The Affidavit makes not [sic] mention of the fact the
alleged marijuana, methamphetamine, and drug paraphernalia were found was [sic] pursuant to a specific search for
those substances and not simply a discovery in plain view. In addition, the alleged marijuana and methamphetamine
had not been determined to be those substances. There is no indication the items were field tested and it was later
determined that the suspected methamphetamine on the cotton ball was actually cocaine . . . .‖).
153
Troxel, 564 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1241.
154
Id.
155
Id. at 10.
156
Transcript of Motion to Suppress Proceedings at 31, 39, 68, 72, Troxel, 564 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (No. 07-20051JWL).
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methamphetamine but agreed that his affidavit said conclusively that the substance was
methamphetamine.157
Addressing these inaccuracies, the judge concluded that the officers‘ testimony ―taken
together show that these statements were knowingly and intentionally made by Sergeant
Chambers.‖
In Case Number 26 (Maldonado), during an evidentiary hearing on the defendant‘s
motion to suppress, the government called just one police witness, Officer Cooper of the Wichita
(Kansas) Police Department. With the help of leading questions from the prosecutor, the officer
explained why he had stopped the defendant‘s pickup truck during highway travel, testifying
about how he acquired the defendant‘s consent to search the truck.158 During that search, police
officers found drugs in the truck‘s bed wall.159
Early in the defense‘s cross-examination of Officer Cooper, the officer admitted that he
and his partner followed the defendant‘s truck ―[b]ecause it was tagged out of Texas,‖ as
opposed to deciding to investigate the truck because of a traffic violation.160 The defense then
began to highlight doubtful details from the officer‘s testimony. The defense elicited Officer
Cooper‘s admission that he entered the highway at mile marker 45 and began following the
defendant but that he did not observe any traffic infraction until marker 46, about 1 mile later.
The officer also acknowledged that the defendant‘s eventual traffic infraction was minor—―the
only thing that drifted over the dotted line were the tires on the driver‘s side.‖161 The defense
also elicited that nothing about the defendant‘s license, registration, the purchase of his pickup,

157

Id. at 65, 89.
Transcript of Motion to Suppress Proceedings at 6, 10, 17-19, United States v. Maldonado, 614 F. Supp. 2d 1179
(D. Kan. 2009) (No. 08-10216-01-JTM).
159
Id. at 23.
160
Id. at 27-28.
161
Id. at 28.
158
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or any other information raised any suspicion of the defendant‘s wrongdoing prior to the consent
search.162
By the conclusion of the prosecutor‘s re-direct examination of Officer Cooper, the judge
appeared to doubt the officer‘s credibility. Speaking directly to the officer, the judge said:
―Officer, I‘ve got to tell you, I‘m a little troubled that you decided to follow him because he was
tagged out of Texas. Now, there are a lot of vehicles that come up [highway] 135 that have
Texas tags or Oklahoma tags, isn‘t that accurate?‖163
In a successful effort to create inconsistencies in the testimony of the government‘s only
witness, the defense called two other police witnesses. The first was Officer Cooper‘s partner,
who was with Officer Cooper in the police cruiser. The second was a sheriff‘s deputy who
helped search the defendant‘s pickup. The partner testified that he saw the defendant‘s truck
drift from its lane only one time, not two, as Officer Cooper had testified.164 He also testified
that the lane violation occurred after two miles of observation, not earlier, as Officer Cooper had
said.165 In addition, the partner‘s written report contradicted Officer Cooper‘s testimony about
the timing of Officer Cooper‘s request to search the defendant‘s truck.166 A second defense
police witness highlighted more doubt about Officer Cooper‘s version of events. Although
Officer Cooper had testified that a sheriff‘s deputy just happened on the traffic stop after a drug
dog alerted to defendant‘s truck, the deputy testified that Officer Cooper told the deputy to ―join
[Cooper] at the stop.‖167

162

Id. at 37.
Id. at 44.
164
Id. at 48. On cross-examination by the prosecutor, Cooper‘s partner testified that he was watching the
defendant‘s pickup truck but only saw it leave its lane once.
165
Id. at 48.
166
Id. at 52.
167
Id. at 7.
163
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Although my insights are necessarily limited to those that someone can glean from
reviewing a written transcript, the deputy‘s answers appeared evasive even on paper. For
example, when asked whether a video from his car taken at the time of the stop showed the
deputy accelerating to the scene, the deputy insisted: ―I don‘t know where I was going at this
time. I have no idea where I was going.‖168
The judge interrupted this questioning, admonishing the deputy not to talk over the
lawyer; however, the deputy continued to avoid answering questions directly.169 The deputy
insisted that he ―d[id]n‘t know if [he was] heading to [Officer Cooper‘s] place‖ at the time on the
video, even though his own police report said that at approximately the same time, he ―was
contacted by Officer Cooper to assist him with a car stop‖ at ―Mile Marker 47.‖170
The deputy‘s written report, which was made contemporaneously with this investigation,
also contradicted Officer Cooper‘s direct examination testimony.

Defense counsel elicited

testimony that in the original report, a word had been deleted using white out.171 Although the
deputy testified that he did not know what word was removed, in context, it appeared that he had
removed the word so that the report did not reflect that three drug-dog searches had been
conducted before drugs were found.172
At the conclusion of the evidentiary portion of the suppression hearing, the judge
announced orally: ―I simply don‘t believe the officers in terms of their reasons for pulling him
over. I am making a credibility determination and finding that they are not credible in this case. .
. . The evidence in this case . . . I am suppressing the evidence.‖173

168

Id. at 12.
Id. at 13, 15.
170
Id. at 23.
171
Id. at 29-30.
172
Id. at 30.
173
Id. at 56-57.
169
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Although the trial judges in Troxel and Maldonado were persuaded by inconsistencies
between and among officers‘ testimony, judges in other cases seemed equally unpersuaded by
such contradictions.174
C. The Significance of the Kansas Data
1. What Police Perjury in Kansas Suggests About Police Perjury Elsewhere
The Federal District of Kansas encompasses the entire state. The state, in turn, includes a
portion of Kansas City, a diverse metropolitan area of about 450,375 people, six smaller cities,
and an expansive rural area used mostly for farming. In 2008, Kansas had a population of
2,802,134.175 About 89% of the Kansas population is white.176 About 50% of residents are
female.177 In 2008, 45% of registered voters were registered Republicans, with unaffiliated
voters outnumbering Democrats.178 The Federal District of Kansas includes ten district court
judges and seven magistrate judges. There are three divisions within the district—Kansas City,

174

In addition to the Maldonado and Troxel orders, five orders discussed police inconsistencies. See, e.g., United
States v. Tapia, No. 06-20072-JWL, 2007 WL 3487151 (D. Kan. Nov. 13, 2007) (Case Number 2) (defendant called
an officer to testify and elicited errors or inconsistencies in a police report and argued that police conducted a
warrantless search; despite government‘s failure to produce the warrant at the evidentiary hearing, judge ruled for
government); United States v. Donaghue, No. 07-10022-03, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87023 (D. Kan. Nov. 26, 2007)
(Case Number 4) (during hearing, defendant showed that police possessed several documents establishing that
defendant‘s address was not the one in the affidavit for a search warrant); United States v. Dixon, 546 F. Supp. 2d
1198 (D. Kan. 2008) (Case Number 12) (several police officers testified, revealing inconsistencies about whether the
first officer to interview the defendant communicated to the second interviewer that the defendant had invoked his
right to silence); United States v. Roberts, 572 F. Supp. 2d 1240 (D. Kan. 2008) (Case Number 18) (defendant
pointed to discrepancies in the evidence, such as an affidavit showing that defendant was present at 6:12 when video
showed defendant present at 5:24); United States v. Johnson, No. 08-40010-01-RDR, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43949
(D. Kan. May 22, 2009) (Case Number 30) (there were inconsistencies between the officers‘ testimony and the
dispatch record).
175
Kansas QuickFacts from the US Census Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/20000.html. See also
Census Bureau Bumps Kansas City’s Population by 25,455, KAN. CITY BUS. J., Feb. 6, 2009,
http://www.bizjournals.com/kansascity/stories/2009/02/02/daily63.html.
176
Kansas QuickFacts, supra note 175.
177
Id.
178
See Palin Gives McCain Extra Boost in Kansas, USA TODAY, Sept. 27, 2008,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/politics/election2008/2008-09-27-kansas-election_N.htm.
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Topeka, and Wichita.179 Located almost exactly in the center of the United States, Kansas
appears similar to many other Midwestern states in terms of population, demographics, and
geography.180
In this seemingly typical Midwestern jurisdiction, criminal defendants rarely assert in
court pleadings or hearings that police have lied about the investigation of their cases.
Extrapolating from the thirty-one of 584 orders, defendants claimed police perjury in
approximately 2.24% of all cases.181 Eighty-four percent of defendants‘ perjury allegations were
made in the context of motions to suppress evidence. In particular, defendants usually argued
police perjury in a motion challenging a search or seizure. The majority of these motions were
filed in cases charging the defendant with a drug crime; about one-third were raised in cases
charging the defendant with a gun crime. Even though defendants were not quick to assert that
police had committed perjury, about 23% of their allegations had no chance to succeed because
the defendant produced no supporting evidence. Nevertheless, in 68% of the cases in which a
defendant claimed police perjury, the defendant produced evidence creating at least a debate on
the issue. In 29%, the defendant produced substantial evidence of at least one false police
statement. Some defendants produced documents that contradicted the police; some called nonpolice witnesses in support of their allegations; others depended on their lawyers to conduct an

179

The Kansas state judicial system includes seven Supreme Court Justices, thirteen judges on the Court of Appeals,
thirty-one judicial districts for one hundred and five counties, and numerous municipal courts. See Kansas Court
System, http://www.kscourts.org/pdf/ctchart.pdf.
180
See, e.g., Iowa QuickFacts from the US Census Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/19000.html
(indicating that in 2009, Iowa had an estimated population of three million people: 50% female, 93.9% white, and
about fifty-two people per square mile of land; Nebraska had an estimated 1.8 million people: 50% female, 91%
white, and about twenty-two people per square mile of land; Missouri, which includes part of the metropolitan
Kansas City area, had 5.9 million people: 51% of whom are female, with 85% white population).
181
This percentage was derived from averaging the number of cases pending in the District of Kansas at the
beginning of Fiscal Year 2008 and the number of cases pending at the end of Fiscal Year 2008, which yielded 691
cases. Then, I multiplied the average number of cases per year (691) by 2 (the number of years for which I gathered
data). That yielded 1,382 cases. I then divided the number of cases for two years by the number of orders in FY
2008 and 2009 in which defendants claimed police dishonesty (31). That calculation estimated that defendants
allege police lies in about 2.24% of all cases brought in the District of Kansas.
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aggressive cross-examination of the police to highlight doubtful and inconsistent police
testimony and written reports. Despite the small number of police perjury allegations and the
varied methods defendants used in attempting to prove their claims, only two of thirty-one
defendants convinced judges in the District of Kansas to rule that the police had lied to cover up
unconstitutional behaviors and, correspondingly, to apply the exclusionary rule as a remedy.
Because this study covers only one of 94 federal judicial districts, 182 there is no guarantee
that its findings are representative of judges‘ rulings nationwide. But Kansas looks similar to
many other Midwestern jurisdictions, and there is no reason to believe that Kansas is atypical.
Thus, if judges throughout the United States are rejecting defendants‘ allegation of police
dishonesty at the same rate federal judges in Kansas are rejecting them, then judges across the
country are probably fostering police perjury.183 In a typical fiscal year, U.S. attorneys initiate
63,000 criminal cases in federal district courts.184 Extrapolating from the Kansas findings, in
approximately 1,411 of those cases, a defendant will assert police dishonesty, and of those 1,411
cases, a judge will find police dishonesty in only 92 (6.5% of cases). 185 Even more problematic
for purposes of reducing police dishonesty, in 29% of cases in which defendants formally claim
police perjury, the balance of the evidence will favor the defendant‘s claim. Nevertheless, trial
judges will reject even defendants‘ strongest proof about 78% of the time. Perhaps even more

182

See District Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov./districtcourts.html (―There are 94 federal judicial districts,
including at least one district in each state, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico.‖).
183
There is no reason to think that judicial acceptance of police perjury is not more pronounced in the state courts,
where judges often face intense pressures from re-election campaigns to remain ―tough on crime.‖ There is also no
reason to believe that police perjury is not more rampant in big cities, like New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago,
than it is in Kansas City, the biggest city and most urban setting in Kansas.
184
See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEYS‘ ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2006 (2006); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: EXECUTIVE
OFFICE FOR UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS‘ ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT: FISCAL
YEAR 2007 (2007); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, UNITED
STATES ATTORNEYS‘ ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2008 (2008). This figure was derived from
averaging and then rounding down the fiscal years‘ data.
185
The 6.5% represents the percentage of orders in which Kansas judges found police dishonesty when defendants
argued the issue. See supra Part III.B.1.

52
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1534132

troubling, in another 48% of cases, the evidence will be competing, and credibility could
arguably be decided for either the government or the defendant. In these close cases, if Kansas is
typical, trial judges would decide for the government on the issue of police credibility 100% of
the time.
In other words, if federal district court judges in Kansas are representative of federal
district court judges nationwide, then trial judges ―habitually accept[] the policeman‘s word‖ in
the face of mounting anecdotal and empirical evidence that, not uncommonly, police commit
perjury to circumvent the exclusionary rule.186
2. The Supreme Court‘s Current View of the Exclusionary Rule Overemphasizes the
Cost of Releasing Defendants, Urging Judges to Err in Favor of Police Credibility
The results of this study suggest at least three possibilities. First, trial judges in the
District of Kansas may consciously or subconsciously embrace Judge Cardozo‘s view that the
criminal should not go free when the constable blunders, a view seemingly also favored by a
majority of the current Supreme Court. Second, the Kansas trial judges may be clumsy at
identifying police perjury.187 Third, the judges may be effectively identifying police dishonesty
in all cases in which it occurs.

Although a plausible argument can be offered for each

alternative, the third possibility seems at least somewhat less likely than the first two. Given the
diversity of prior studies and other anecdotal evidence suggesting that police are prone to lie to
avoid the exclusionary rule, as well as the fact that most perjury allegations in this study were
raised in the suppression context, alternatives one and two appear more probable than alternative
three, even before the specific results of the Kansas study are tallied. Moreover, considering the
186

See Wilson, supra note 17 (cataloguing evidence of police lies during criminal investigations).
See Maureen O‘Sullivan, Mark G. Frank, Carolyn M. Hurley & Jaspreet Tiwana, Police Lie Detection Accuracy:
The Effect of Lie Scenario, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 530 (2008) (most people ―are not better than chance in
detecting deception‖); Olin Guy Wellborn, III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075 (1991) (―According to the
empirical evidence, ordinary people cannot make effective use of demeanor in deciding whether to believe a
witness.‖) .
187
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Kansas study, in approximately 87% of cases in which the evidence seemed balanced or stronger
in support of a finding that police may have committed perjury, judges, nevertheless, found
officers credible. Twenty-one of twenty-four of these rulings were issued in the context of
deciding a defendant‘s motion to suppress evidence. Thus, in about 90% of the cases with equal
or more evidence of police perjury, trial judges in Kansas refused to apply the exclusionary rule.
At least circumstantially, judges‘ denial of so many motions to suppress in cases with competing
and substantial evidence of police perjury demonstrates a greater tolerance for potential police
perjury than for release of seemingly guilty defendants.
There are countless reasons for any one judge to favor the government when a defendant
alleges that the police lied about the investigation of his case, even in situations where we could
control for the quality and amount of evidence. As discussed previously, a judge may worry
about appearing soft on crime. She may be familiar with an officer from prior cases and be
reluctant to call that officer a liar.188 Many judges are appointed to the bench after serving as
prosecutors, potentially creating pro-government bias from the outset.

But all of these

tendencies to favor the government could be reduced by a strong Supreme Court standard
denouncing police perjury in suppression matters. Rather than denounce police perjury, the
majority‘s current conception of the exclusionary rule neglects the problem and naturally, even if
unwittingly, leads trial judges to tend to favor police testimony in both close and doubtful cases.
The Supreme Court‘s current interpretation of the exclusionary rule leads trial judges to
undervalue the costs of police lies in all but those cases exhibiting the most flagrant police
perjury and misconduct. In recent decisions, including Herring, a majority of justices announced
a legally-mandated preference for preserving evidence of a defendant‘s guilt rather than

188

These pressures may be greatest for state court judges who are typically elected, but federal judges may also
respond to these influences, consciously or subconsciously.
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protecting other values of the justice system, such as judicial and justice system integrity. For
example, in Herring, Justice Roberts criticized Justice Ginsburg for envisioning an exclusionary
rule that would further goals other than deterrence of unconstitutional police conduct, writing:
―Justice Ginsburg‘s dissent champions what she describes as ―‗a more majestic conception‘ of . .
. the exclusionary rule,‘‘ . . . which would exclude evidence even where deterrence does not
justify doing so. Majestic or not, our cases reject this conception.‖189 Because a majority of the
Court stresses the risk of letting the guilty escape punishment without accounting for cases (like
those involving police perjury), which impose extensive costs on the justice system, the Court‘s
current interpretation of the exclusionary rule naturally urges trial judges to forgive questionable
police testimony in an eagerness to protect evidence of the defendant‘s guilt.
As Justice Ginsburg indicated in her dissent in Herring, the most serious impact of the
majority‘s insistence on an exclusionary rule that weighs only the benefits of deterrence against
the cost of allowing a guilty defendant to escape prosecution will ―be on innocent persons.‖190 In
Herring, Justice Ginsburg was concerned about the arrest of persons on the basis of erroneous
information from police databases. Justice Ginsburg‘s concern about the harassment of innocent
citizens validly extends to the search context. In a typical case, police may stop and search
people traveling in public areas without probable cause. Provided the citizen is innocent and
possesses no contraband, her case never reaches criminal court.191 Even in cases in which the
police stop a person without legal reason but lie to create probable cause after finding
contraband, the majority‘s anemic exclusionary rule, which is rarely imposed, will undermine the
public‘s faith in the integrity of police. To the extent the public becomes aware of such unlawful
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Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700 n.2 (2009).
Id. at 705 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
191
An innocent person is unlawfully stopped and harassed and has no practical recourse for the invasion of privacy
and liberty.
190
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conduct, citizens will doubt the police in future cases and presumably become less cooperative in
police investigations. Moreover, to the extent judges seem to ignore such police behaviors,
judges become part of a corrupt process, casting doubt on the entire law enforcement system.
The influence of the Supreme Court‘s current conception of the exclusionary rule on trial
judges‘ fact-finding missions to decide credibility is more obvious in context. When a defendant
moves to suppress evidence, claiming that police violated his constitutional rights and are now
lying to cover up that misconduct, a trial judge has four choices: 1) decide for the defendant on
credibility—finding that police gave perjured testimony to cover up unconstitutional behavior; 2)
decide for the government on credibility—finding that police truthfully explained that they
uncovered evidence of defendant‘s guilt through constitutional means; 3) presume or find as a
factual matter that police lied, but rule that any such lie is legally irrelevant; or 4) rule for the
government because of a lack of proof.
When trial judges view evidence of criminal activity through the lens of the majority‘s
two-goal exclusionary rule, option 1 seems destined for rejection in favor of options two, three or
four, except in cases with obvious police lies or patently offensive police misconduct. Especially
in cases with competing evidence for and against police credibility, and even in cases with
significant evidence of at least one or two false statements, the need for deterrence will seem
weak when viewed with the benefit of hindsight, knowing that police uncovered a crime and a
probable criminal. Thus, trial judges are naturally inclined to deny motions to suppress, even in
cases exhibiting some evidence of police perjury. Of course, if a defendant produces particularly
persuasive evidence that police have lied in an attempt to win a conviction, the trial judge may
experience serious doubts about both police testimony and the defendant‘s guilt. In those cases
with significant evidence of police dishonesty, the need for deterrence will appear more
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compelling. Those are the cases (like Case Numbers 16 and 26 in my study) with the best
chance for suppression of evidence.
Option One: When confronted with a defendant‘s claim that an officer violated his
constitutional rights and then lied about the misconduct, the trial judge‘s first option is to find
that the defendant established police perjury to conceal unconstitutional behavior and to grant the
defendant‘s motion to suppress evidence. Assuming that a judge rules in this way, there are two
possibilities. One, the judge could be correct. The police violated the defendant‘s constitutional
rights and lied to make it appear that the evidence of defendant‘s guilt was obtained legally.
Two, the judge may have ruled incorrectly. Although some evidence indicated that the police
lied, in actuality, the police told the truth. Perhaps, the story was a bit convoluted, and one
officer became confused under cross-examination, thus creating the appearance of dishonesty
even though the officers had obtained the evidence in compliance with the defendant‘s
constitutional rights.
Applying the Supreme Court majority‘s view of the exclusionary rule, the second
outcome is a travesty of justice. Deterrence is not served because there is no police misconduct
to deter, and the resulting ruling undermines ―basic concepts of the criminal justice system,‖
including ―truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives‖ because a guilty defendant will
(probably) be released. But notice, the first ruling is not much better. Yes, the police lied, which
is less than ideal. But the exclusionary rule is not concerned with the potential loss of popular
trust in the government or possible taint the judiciary may suffer from ignoring police lies.
Moreover, while imposition of the exclusionary rule in this case might deter some officers from
telling lies, as discussed in the introduction to this paper, others would learn to lie more
convincingly. Thus, the cost of releasing a guilty defendant is substantial and arguably greater
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than the likelihood or importance of deterring future police misconduct of this kind. In fact,
under the majority‘s two-competing-value conception, the cost of imposing the rule in most
cases is too great. When there are only two competing interests, deterrence and release of a
guilty and dangerous defendant, deterrence will seldom win.
Option Two: In terms of incentives to find for the government, the trial judge‘s second
option looks exactly like the first. As long as the judge can plausibly find that police testified
credibly, she can deny the defendant‘s motion to suppress. As in the first case, there is no need
for deterrence because under this scenario, the police told a believable story and accurately
identified the guilty criminal. Denying the motion to suppress will ensure that a guilty defendant
faces trial for his illegal conduct. Thus, again the benefits of denying the defendant‘s motion to
suppress prevail over the benefits.
Option Three: If the evidence of police dishonesty seems persuasive, a trial judge may
find that police lack credibility or at least assume, without deciding, that defendant‘s contention
is true. But even then, if the focus is on deterrence and guilt, there may be no incentive to
exclude evidence. In addition to its disfavor of the exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court has
established that the presence of police perjury in a case does not necessarily taint the whole case,
an entire police affidavit, or even require suppression of a particular piece of evidence. As a
result, a trial judge who assumes or finds police perjury is not duty bound to suppress evidence.
As the Court held in Franks,192 a trial judge is permitted to set aside a portion of testimony
tainted by police perjury and determine (as if there were no perjury) how the case should be
decided once the tainted portion is removed from consideration. For example, if an officer lies
about the information he received from a cooperating witness to pad an affidavit in support of a
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Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (only false statements in an affidavit that are necessary to the
Magistrate Judge‘s probable-cause determination matter; other false statements, even if intentional, are irrelevant).
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search warrant, the warrant obtained with the perjury is not necessarily invalid. If the trial judge
finds in hindsight that the affidavit was sufficient to create probable cause, although weak
without the perjury, the trial judge must deny the defendant‘s motion to suppress. Furthermore,
given that a case will not reach court unless the affidavit, weak or not, is redeemed by the
evidence of guilt officers found using it, once again the tendency will be for judges to find police
perjury irrelevant even when police perjury appears to exist.
Option Four: Finally, a judge can find a lack of proof of police perjury. For the reasons
expressed in options one through three, judges‘ tendencies will be to deny a defendant‘s motion
in all but the most obvious cases. Unless there is extensive evidence of patent police lies (the
strongest case for deterrence), there is little reason to deter police from other successful
investigations of this kind.
In sum, in a legal system that values the exclusionary rule only as a tool for deterrence,
trial judges who faithfully apply the Supreme Court‘s precedent will disfavor suppression in all
four scenarios. Now, consider the trial judge‘s same options from the perspective of a system
that embraces a more majestic conception of the exclusionary rule, a system in which, when
deciding motions to suppress, a judge should consider his own integrity and the appearance that
he is encouraging perjury. The outcome in cases with debatable and significant evidence of
police dishonesty would often resolve differently. Judges would be more likely to suppress
evidence if denying such motions meant that judges were personally approving of police tactics
and testimony. From this perspective, ―[a] rule admitting evidence in a criminal trial . . . has the
necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct which produced the evidence . . . .‖193 Therefore,
trial judges would apply the exclusionary rule to deter unwanted police misconduct and to

193

Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 707 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 US. 1, 13 (1968)).
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maintain the citizens‘ respect for a fair and impartial process by protecting the process from
contamination of likely police illegality and perjury. 194
Adoption of the Ginsburg-Stevens more majestic exclusionary rule would encourage the
government to present consistent and convincing testimony from police during suppression
hearings and, where possible, to corroborate that testimony with video evidence, documents, and
eyewitness testimony. Judges would be more cautious about accepting evidence in cases with
conflicting police testimony and in cases in which the defendant introduced other persuasive
evidence that police may have lied to cover up unconstitutional behaviors.

A standard

emphasizing the importance of judicial and system integrity might also influence those judges
who are inept at evaluating police credibility by encouraging them in close cases to consider how
the public would perceive the probabilities of the police testimony. This increased judicial
scrutiny of police would ultimately better protect citizens‘ constitutional rights, promote popular
trust in government generally, and assist all of the honest, hard-working police who benefit from
gaining the trust of the citizens they serve. At least in cases of potential police perjury, the
Ginsburg-Stevens conception of the exclusionary rule recognizes that the cost of releasing any
one guilty defendant may not be as costly as allowing police to avoid application of the
exclusionary rule by lying about their own conduct.
Conclusion
Several prior studies have demonstrated that police sometimes, if not often, lie in an
attempt to avoid the effects of the exclusionary rule. This study of federal trial judges in the
District of Kansas suggests that judges may be fostering this police perjury.

Judges may

unwittingly encourage police perjury because they subconsciously recognize that acknowledging
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Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) The Exclusionary Rule Rest On A
“Principled Basis” Rather than An “Empirical Proposition”?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 600 (1983)).
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perjury will probably result in release of a culpable defendant. Judges may also permit perjury
because they cannot determine when police are lying.

In either case, the Supreme Court

majority‘s conception of the exclusionary rule naturally leads trial judges to deny defendants‘
motions to suppress. When trial judges consider police deterrence as the sole reason to invoke
the exclusionary rule, judges necessarily consider the police‘s success in uncovering evidence of
the defendant‘s guilt, a desirable, not deterrent-worthy result. To awaken trial judges‘ vigilance
about police dishonesty, which corrupts a reliable justice system by obtaining the admission of
tainted evidence, this article argues for the Ginsburg-Stevens more majestic conception of the
exclusionary rule. Such a conception does not require a change in the law but, rather, a return to
the Supreme Court‘s earlier precedent, explaining that although deterrence of police misconduct
is an important and primary goal of the exclusionary rule, the rule also serves to protect justice
system integrity.
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APPENDIX

Date

Case No. Case Name

Type of
Motion

Motion to
US v. Harvey Suppress;
1 10/2/2007 07-40030 (Bernard)
denied

US v. Tapia
2 11/13/2007 06-20072 (Felix)

Motion to
Suppress;
denied

US v. Parker
3 11/13/2007 07-20063 (Michael E.)

Motion for
Acquittal
and New
Trial;
denied

Search/
Seizure?

Legal Grounds for
Challenge

Judge Accept/Reject Claim

4th A (Franks) -- Def
challenged affidavit in
support of warrant for
Yes; search of lack of PC; brief did
Sam A. Crow (Sr Judge);
residence
not claim police lies
rejected

Evidence of Lies
Hearing held; judge said def
"summarily argue[d]" the Franks
point. Judge said def's brief "fails
to identify what information . . .
Was misleading. . . And was
known .. . To be false."

Hearing held; Def called 1 witn Offcr Johnson who wrote a report
saying def had parole violation;
police at hearing said it was a
probation violation; gov't
supposedly had warrant for arrest
but failed to produce the warrant at
the hearing or at time of arrest;
defendant's post-arrest statement
referenced warrant; officer testified
that he obtained one and "the
4th A and 5th A -- Def
court determines the testimony
Yes; search of challenged arrest
credible" Also, def "provided little
home
warrant
John W. Lungstrum; rejected evidence to refute it."
Unstated -- Def
claimed that detective
who identified def's
voice on phone call
made up his mind to
identify defendant
Kathryn H. Vratil; rejected -before listening to
said jury's decision to decide
No
voice
officer's credibility
Post-trial motion so jury decided

Gun/Drug Case?

Explicit/
Implicit

Govt
Agent

Drugs;ammunition
(telephone count;
PWID w/I 1000 ft of
school; felon in
possession of
ammunition)

E

Unstated

Drugs and Guns;
(PWID cocaine; PWID
marijuana; poss of
firearm; maintaining
drug residence)

E

FBI

I

Unstated,
probably
Lawrence
police

No -- false bomb
threats called in to 911
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Date

Case No. Case Name

US v.
Donaghue
(Charles
4 11/26/2007 07-10022 Laliberte)

Type of
Motion

Search/
Seizure?

Motion to
Suppress
and for
Brady; mtn
suppress
Yes; search of
denied
home

Legal Grounds for
Challenge

4th A (Franks) -- Def
alleged affidavit
contained false
statements and
material omissions

Judge Accept/Reject Claim

Wesley E. Brown (Sr.
Judge); rejected -- said "[N]o
question here but that the
affidavit contained a false
statement relating to
ownership of the 6th Street
residence. But the
Government has presented
evidence to show that the
error was likely due to
inadvertence[.]" Order at 7.
"The evidence here showed
nothing beyond an innocent
mistake or simple negligence
. . . ." Judge would have
found PC anyway.

Evidence of Lies

Gun/Drug Case?

Hearing held; Def showed that
police had numerous documents
indicating defendant's address was
not the one in the affidavit, such as
deed records; Wichita Police
testified; Minneapolis police
testified too
Drugs

John W. Lungstrum; rejected
-- said def "has not
articulated facts that show
2255;
Yes; challenge
deficiency in his counsel's
Ineffective to affidavit
performance"; defendant
US v. Nelson assistance which relied 4th A; Ineffective
offers only "conclusory
Just allegations and unclear ones
5 11/28/2007 04-20048 (Barry)
of counsel on informants Assistance of Counsel statements" Order at 5.
in defendant’s brief
Drugs and Guns
No; challenge
to PSR over
8.58 grams of
meth
US v. Burtin Objections attributed to
6 12/18/2007 07-10111 (Alexander, L.) to PSR
defendant
Unstated
Motion to
Suppress
and mtn for
Bill of
Particulars;
mtn
4th A -- Def claimed
suppress
Yes; search of that officers entered
US v. Redding denied; bill defendant's
curtilage of his home
7 2/7/2008 06-40116 (Matthew)
p granted trash
and took trash

Explicit/
Implicit

Govt
Agent

E

Wichita
Kansas and
Minneapolis
PD

I

Unstated

Wesley E. Brown; accepted - said gov't failed to provide
evidentiary support that
defendant's relevant conduct
should include these drugs None

Drugs

I

Unstated

Julie A. Robinson; rejected -found trash was outside
curtilage but that there was
no reasonable expectation of
privacy anyway
Unstated

Drugs

I

Jackson
County PD

63
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1534132

Date

8

9

10

11

12

Case No. Case Name

Type of
Motion
Motion to
Suppress;
mtn
discover, et
al; mtn
suppress
denied

Search/
Seizure?

Legal Grounds for
Challenge

Judge Accept/Reject Claim

Evidence of Lies

Gun/Drug Case?

Yes; search of
defendant's
4th A --Defendant
car after
claimed, among other
monitored
things, that drugs were Sam A. Crow; never
US v. Hayes
phone
not in plain view, as
addressed -- used legal
3/11/2008 07-40036 (Lamar, M.)
conversations officers claimed
grounds to deny motion
Unstated
Drugs
Yes; search of
defendant's
US v. Charles Motion to person
4th A -- def's version
Hearing held; two officers testified
(Ronald
Suppress; uncovered
of events different than
for gov't and eye witness testified
3/11/2008 07-40140 Eugene)
denied
gun
police's
Sam A. Crow; rejected
for defendant
Guns
Yes;
defendant
claimed that
officer stopped
John W. Lungstrum; rejected Post-trial motion so judge reviewed
his car to
-- Def's "recitation of the facts trial transcript; defendant claimed
harass its
is contradicted by the record counsel ineffective for failing to file
occupants not
and the facts as found in the motion to suppress; argued that
US v. Mims
for a traffic
4th A; Ineffective
record show Mr. Mims' claim officer lacked PC to stop car,
3/14/2008 05-20079 (Marlo, J.)
2255 violation
Assistance of Counsel has no merit."
stopped for harassment
Guns
Yes;
Motion to defendant
Suppress, claimed,
denied; mtn among other
to dismiss, things, that his
granted in wife's consent
part; motion to search their
to
house was
4th A and 5th A and
determine coerced by
Miranda -- Def
John W. Lungstrum; rejected
admissibility threats to
challenged the search -- notes that officers
of
place child in of his house, his
testimony showed that no
US v. Wattree statements, protective
subsequent custodial mention was made of child Hearing held; Unstated; judge
4/11/2008 07-20151 (Michael)
admissible custody
statements
custody
credited officers' testimony
Drugs and Guns
Hearing held; evidence was
Motions to
conflicting on whether officers
Suppress,
asked about same robberies after
denied;
defendant invoked Miranda;
mtns to
Several police witnesses testified; Guns -- Hobbs Act
dismiss,
Def's brief claimed that the
robberies; use and
US v. Dixon denied;
Yes; but not
"subject of the second
poss of firearm during
(Lenard
discovery the focus of
4th A and 5th A and
interrogation was wholly related to crime of violence; felon
4/24/2008 07-40124 Chauncy)
motions
the challenge Miranda
Sam A. Crow; rejected
the first."
in poss

Explicit/
Implicit

Govt
Agent

E

DEA (task
force) and
Topeka PD

E

Topeka PD

E

Kansas City
PD

I

Kansas City
Kansas PD
and ATF
task force

I

Topeka PD
and
Shawnee
County
Sheriffs
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Date

Case No. Case Name

Type of
Motion

Motion to
US v. Stewart Suppress,
13 4/28/2008 06-40160 (Bernice (f)) denied

US v. SotoAlanis
14 4/28/2008 07-40149 (Francisco)

15

Search/
Seizure?

Legal Grounds for
Challenge
Judge Accept/Reject Claim
Title III (statutory) -Def claimed that her
crim history was
misstated in affidavit
for warrant and
claimed that no drug
transactions occurred
in her residence as
described in the
Yes; of
affidavit -- Franks
conversations challenge
Julie A. Robinson; rejected

Motion to
Suppress,
denied;Mtn
for
discovery,
4th Amendment; traffic
granted in Yes; search of stop; def denied
part
car
committing infractions Julie A. Robinson; rejected

US v. Ndiaye 2255,
6/3/2008 05-40017 (Serigne)
denied

No;

Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel -- Def
claimed that counsel
failed to challenge
officers' false
testimony about
defendant's postarrest statements
Sam A. Crow; rejected

Evidence of Lies

Gun/Drug Case?

Hearing held; ct said def "made no
offer of proof that Officer Garman
misrepresented her criminal
history" and found the officer "to be
credible and trustworthy and
accepts his testimony as true." Ct
noted def's lack of evidence to
Drugs -conspiracy
contrary
PWID cocaine
Hearing held; officers testified that
defendant committed traffic
infractions leading to stop;
defendant denied infractions; court
credited officers -- "The Court finds
both Swanson's and Mangels'
testimony credible and consistent .
. . " "While defendant denies
committing this infraction in his
motion, he has offered no such
Drugs -- PWID
proof."
methamphetamine
No hearing; def submitted an
unsworn statement in support of
his claims; the government
provided an affidavit from def's trial
counsel; the court noted def's
"mere assertion" Order at 20 and
"The court has not found in
Ndiaye's other filings any further
argument explaining or developing
this claim."
Drugs

Explicit/
Implicit

Govt
Agent

E

Topeka Pd
and DEA
Task force

E

Salina
County
Sheriff's
Dept, drug
task force;
Salina PD

E

Unstated
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Date

Case No. Case Name

US v. Troxel
16 6/17/2008 07-20051 (John D)

Type of
Motion

Motion to
Suppress,
denied in
part and
granted in
part

Search/
Seizure?

Legal Grounds for
Challenge

Yes; search of
home
4th A (Franks) --

Judge Accept/Reject Claim

Evidence of Lies

Gun/Drug Case?

John W. Lungstrum;
accepted -- Judge found
inaccuracies and material
omissions from the affidavit -"The court's conclusions that
these statements were false
or omitted are based on the
evidence at the March 17,
2008, hearing." The officers'
testimony "taken together
Hearing held; defendant pointed to
show that these statements specific portions of the officer's
were knowingly and
affidavit that were false; during
intentionally made by
hearing, counsel cross examined
Sergeant Chambers."
officer about inaccuracies
Drugs and Guns

Motion to
Suppress,
denied

J. Thomas Marten; rejected - "[B]ecause Mr. Phy testified
that he could not see the
4th A -- Def claimed entire vehicle, his testimony
Yes; search of that drug dog did not that he did not see the dog
car
actually alert to her car alert is not entirely credible."

Hearing held; two deputies testified
that dog did alert; def introduced
eyewitness, an inmate at Phillips
County Jail who said he did not
see dog alert but conceded that
"he was only able to see the front
quarter panel of the driver's side of
the car."
Drugs -- PWID cocaine

Motion to
US v. Roberts Suppress,
18 8/21/2008 08-40048 (Rauou Luran) denied

Sam A. Crow; rejected -affidavits are "presumed to
be valid" "The defendant has
not come forward with a
preponderance of the
4th A -- Def claimed evidence to show that
no PC/RS for search Detective Life . . . Omitted
of car and challenged material information or made
Yes; search of home search on
a false statement
car and home Franks
intentionally"

Hearing held; Def pointed to
discrepancies in the evidence, for
instance, the affidavit showed def
at police station at 6:12 but police Guns -- Felon in
departments own surveillance
possession of ammo
camera showed time at 5:24
and 2 guns

US v. Villa
17 7/30/2008 08-10004 (Esmerelda)

Explicit/
Implicit

Govt
Agent

E

Anderson
County
Sheriff's
Dept

E

Kansas
Patrol;
Phillips
County
Sheriff's
Dept

E

Junction
City Police
Dept
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Date

Case No. Case Name

US v. Walker
(Dale d/b/a
Red Cedar
19 9/23/2008 08-10112 Oil)

Type of
Motion

Motion to
Suppress;
Motion for
Acquittal

Motion to
US v. Apollo Suppress,
20 9/23/2008 08-10111 Energies, Inc. denied

Search/
Seizure?

Legal Grounds for
Challenge

Yes; search of
heater/treaters
used in def's
oil production
pursuant to
4th Amendment -warrant
Franks challenge

Yes; same

4th Amendment -same

Motion to
Suppress,
denied; Mtn
US v. Peralis to preserve Yes; search of 4th Amendment and
21 11/19/2008 08-40055 (Felipe J._)
evidence
car
Miranda

Judge Accept/Reject Claim

Evidence of Lies

Karen M. Humphreys (m);
reject -- relying on fact that
the defendant bears the
burden of proof in a Franks
hearing, judge said def did
not meet burden "Special
Agent Brooks appeared to be Hearing held; Def denied that
a credible witness and his
officer could see in heater treater
testimony was clear and
without manipulating equipment;
specific about the open view affidavit claimed that officer did
hole" In contrast, the judge not; def called contract pumper as
said the pumper witness
witness to testify that he believed
"testified about his normal
the hole was closed and officer
routine"
could not see through it

Gun/Drug Case?

No -- unlawful taking of
migratory birds,
Migratory Bird Treaty
Act

Karen M. Humphreys (m);
reject -- judge "not
persuaded that Walker has
shown that [officer] made
false statements in his
search warrant affidavits.
Again, Special Agent Brooks
appeared to be a credible
witness" And judge noted
that picture showed a dead
bird stuck in the louver,
holding the vent partially
open

Hearing held; Def called pumper
as a witness; agent introduced
picture of open louver with dead
bird caught in it

No -- same as above

Julie A. Robinson, rejected -"[D]efendant's claimed
inability to understand
English is belied by the
evidence and testimony.
First, Trooper Henderson
testified that defendant
understood English . . . "

Hearing held; govt produced
videotape of traffic stop; def
claimed he did not speak English
and could not waive Miranda

Drugs -- PWID
methamphetamine

Wesley E. Brown, rejected -The govt's witness testified
No -- claimed
that def's reference to "three"
too many pills
or "four" meant three or four
US v. Nguyen Order on
attributed to
thousand Ecstasy pills. The
22 11/26/2008 08-10002 (Johnny)
Sentencing him in PSR
Sentencing Guidelines court agreed

Govt agent testified -- "[T]he court
is persuaded that the defendant
more likely than not was in
possession with intent to distribute
4,000 Ecstasy pills . . . "
Drugs -- PWID Ecstasy

Explicit/
Implicit

Govt
Agent

E

US Fish
and Wildlife
Service,
Dept
Interior

E

US Fish
and Wildlife
Service,
Dept
Interior

I

Kansas
Highway
Patrol; DEA

I

DEA task
force
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Date

Case No. Case Name

US v. Prince
23 12/3/2008 08-10020 (Judah)

Type of
Motion

Motion to
Suppress,
denied; Mtn
to preserve
evidence
Yes;

US v.
Motion to
Buchanan
Suppress,
24 1/21/2009 08-40067 (Jason Allen) denied

US v.
Campbell
25 2/13/2009 07-10142 (Jermall)

US v.
Maldonado
26 4/14/2009 08-10216 (Jose)

Search/
Seizure?

Motion to
Suppress,
denied

Motion to
Suppress,
granted

Legal Grounds for
Challenge

4th A -- Franks
challenge

Judge Accept/Reject Claim

Evidence of Lies

Gun/Drug Case?

J. Thomas Marten, rejected - Hearing held; def provided affidavit
- "[I]t is clear that none of the with his motion asserting that
claimed inconsistenes [sic] or affidavit in support of warrant
inaccurate statements by
included deliberately false
Agent Williamson were made statements; govt argued that any
with any kind of intention to false statements were immaterial
mislead . . . "
and inadvertent
Drugs

Yes; search of 4th A -- Franks
home
challenge

Richard D. Rogers, rejected - said facts omitted were not
material and def failed to
prove by preponderance that
Lt. omitted information
intentionally . . .

Yes; search of 4th A -- Franks
home
challenge

J. Thomas Marten, rejected - "nothing seriously
undermines good faith on the
part of law enforcement.
Further, there was nothing
that would indicate
deliberately misleading
information . . . "

Hearing held; def claimed affidavit
relied on unreliable cooperators
and failed to include material info Drugs -- RICO
like cooperating witness that stated charges, gang
that murder weapon did not belong violence, including a
to defendant
murder charge

Yes; search of
car during
traffic stop
4th A --

J. Thomas Marten, accepted
-- "this is the only portion of
Officer Cooper's testimony
that the court finds credible."
"The court finds that the
officers' testimonies
concerning the lane drift is
simply not credible. Not only
does it conflict . . . But there
was absolutely no evidence
of danger."

Hearing held; govt called one
police witness; defendant called
Drugs -- PWID 500 +
two police witnesses who created grams meth and
conflicts in the evidence
cocaine

Def offered an affidavit from a
citizen witness providing an alibi
contradicting the officer's
assertions in his affidavit

Guns -- Felon in poss

Explicit/
Implicit

Govt
Agent

E

ATF;
Newton
Police Dept

E

Dickinson
County
Sheriff's
Dept

E

Sedgwick
County
Sheriff's
Office;
Wichita
Police
Dept;
federal
agents

I

Wichita
Police
Officers;
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Date

Case No. Case Name

Type of
Motion

Search/
Seizure?

Legal Grounds for
Challenge

Judge Accept/Reject Claim

Evidence of Lies
Gun/Drug Case?
2 Hearings held -- one on the orig
motion and one before deciding
motions to reconsider; Def did not
testify; there were inconsistencies
in the officers' testimony -- the
police dispatch record said
defendant was stopped for a tag
light but officer testified that
defendant failed to signal a turn;
there was testimony of the
availability of video in a nearby
gambling facility that might have
Drugs -- PWID
contradicted police accounts
methamphetamine

Explicit/
Implicit

Govt
Agent

E

Potawatomi
Tribal
Police

Motion to
Reconsider
denial of
Motion to
Suppress,
mtn to
suppress
cell phone
US v. Johnson info was
(Robert
granted, all Yes; traffic
Thomas
others
stop, search of
27 5/22/2009 08-40010 Johnson)
denied
car
4th A

Richard D. Rogers, rejected - "The alleged contradictions
and inconsistencies in the
witnesses' testimony by
themselves do not establish
perjury or bad faith in this
court's opinion." "Officer
Hurla seemed credible to the
court."

Motion to
US v. Paez- Suppress,
28 6/18/2009 09-40006 Mata (Ramon) two

Julie A. Robinson, rejected -"The Court finds Trooper
Wolting's testimony credible"
the court also found officer
Heim to be "a credible
Hearing held -- the encounter was Drugs -- PWID crack
witness."
captured on video
and powder cocaine

I

Kansas
Highway
Patrol; DEA

Richard D. Rogers, rejected - "Officer Riggin's testimony
was credible to the court.
Ms. Ridley's testimony was
contradictory . . . " "Officer
Razo's testimony was
consistent with the testimony
of Riggin, except [on one
point]."

I

Topeka
Police Dept

I

Topeka
Police -specific
detective

US v. Ridley
29 7/13/2009 09-40026 (Vincent)

Motion to
Suppress

US v. Johnson
(Darrlyn M.
2255,
30 7/14/2009 03-40139 Johnson)
denied

Yes; traffic
stop

4th A; Miranda

Hearing -- two officers testified for
the govt; a citizen witness testified
for def (she had been cleaning
house and watching def's children
at time of search)
Drugs -- PWID crack

4th A -- defendant's
Yes; search of facts contradicted
home
police's account
Ineffective Assistance
for failure of counsel to
assert misconduct of
detective as defense
in this case -detective was
Julie A. Robinson, rejected -investigated,
"the facts alleged do not
prosecuted and
demonstrate police
dismissed from police misconduct in petitioner's
No hearing -- just pleadings and
No
department
case . . . "
legal arguments submitted

Drugs -- PWId crack
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Date

Case No. Case Name

US v.
Robbins,
31 9/24/2009 09-40002 (Tyler N.)

Type of
Motion

Motion to
Suppress,
denied

Search/
Seizure?

Legal Grounds for
Challenge

Judge Accept/Reject Claim

Evidence of Lies

Gun/Drug Case?

4th A -- def claimed no Julie A. Robinson, rejected -pc for warrant and
defendant's witness's
challenged officer's
testimony "does not directly
Yes; search of observations in
discredit the statement's of
home
support of warrant (but officer Thoman" and there is Hearing held -- two officers
pursuant to
not a Franks
no evidence that officer
testified for govt; def's wife, an eye Guns -- Felon in poss
warrant
challenge)
Thoman lacked credibility
witness testified for defendant
of AK-47s

Explicit/
Implicit

Govt
Agent

I

Concordia
Kansas PD
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